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Many people believe that neoliberal globalization
1
 will lead to prosperity. In Latin 
America, neoliberal economic reform,
2
 the impetus of this current form of globalization, 
has included trade and financial liberalization, industry deregulation, privatization, 
elimination of barriers to foreign investment and a general weakening of the state’s 
control over the economy. Perhaps of all its components, free trade is the most debated 
and central part of this reform. Proponents of free trade argue that less industrialized 
economies will benefit from free trade agreements (FTAs), since their interaction with 
stronger economies will introduce capital which will increase their exports, in turn 
benefiting future economic development (Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 2002b: 149). 
However, free trade and neoliberal economic development in general is in many ways not 
sustainable environmentally, culturally or socially. In this thesis, I will examine how the 
neoliberal economic model affects poverty in Latin America in general and Costa Rica in 
particular.  
The implementation of the neoliberal model began in Latin America primarily in 
the early 1980s
3
 because of the economic debt incurred by the previous economic model 
of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Under ISI, Latin American countries tried 
to promote and expand domestic industries by imposing tariffs or quotas to protect them 
                                                
1
 In this thesis, neoliberal globalization refers to the current paradigm of globalization. Other paradigms 
could exist, however, leading to different outcomes given the right circumstances. A more populist form of 
globalization, for example, while generating less wealth concentration, may lead to less exploitation of 
human and natural resources.   
 
2
 In this thesis, the phrase neoliberal reform is used in a primarily economic sense where the word reform 
refers to the fact that there was once another form of development that the current model replaced. In Latin 
America, this old form of development would be Import Substitution Industrialization. The term neoliberal 
development is used in a similar manner, but without the implied reference to an earlier form of 
development. Neoliberal globalization on the other hand, refers a much larger process with economic, 
political, social, cultural and environmental implications.  
  
3
 Chile actually began implementing the new model in the 1970s under the Pinochet regime.   
 2
from imports, at least initially. However, Latin America had to import capital goods in 
order to upgrade these industries. Unfortunately, the steep prices for these imports 
generally induced heavy borrowing and debt. The debt worsened with the decline in 
world prices for Latin American agricultural exports and the 1979 increase in oil prices, 
leading to the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s. As a way out of debt, 
international monetary lending agencies promised economic aid in return for 
implementing their prescribed neoliberal reforms. However, these reforms have since 
failed to live up to the economic expectations of their creators and followers.         
Originally, the neoliberal economic model followed the “Washington Consensus” 
on development policy and was adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, and many important U.S. agencies. Named after its association with 
international financial organizations located in the U.S. capitol, the Consensus always 
included fiscal discipline, taking steps against inflation, opening up economies to foreign 
trade and investment, reducing the role of the government in general, and promoting new 
exports (Skidmore and Smith, 2005: 59). As complementary to these goals, the 
Consensus also advocated tax reform including cutting marginal tax rates (reducing taxes 
for the rich), creating a unified and competitive exchange rate, and securing property 
rights (particularly for foreigners in developing countries) (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 
538). Any country that implemented all of these goals into their development strategy, 
was taking on neoliberal development in its most orthodox form. However, this orthodox 
policy made no mention of reducing inequality or the need to eliminate absolute poverty 
as a meaningful way to achieve development (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 548).  
 3
In the Americas, policy makers and politicians, who, since the early 1990s began 
to awaken to the fact that economic growth under neoliberal economic development did 
not always translate well into progress in the social sphere of development, adopted the 
New “Santiago”
4
 Consensus as a more complete development model. While an important 
component of the New Consensus constitutes the government’s responsibility to focus on 
poverty elimination, the general view is still one of market-based development with very 
limited government intervention (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 549).  
As a result, the general view on neoliberal economic development has remained 
relatively orthodox with some reformist ideology. However, some wonder if a more 
radical reform of the orthodox neoliberal policy is in order, one that involves shifting 
power back to public bodies and away from actors of private enterprise in order to ensure 
more effective forms of social protection for the majority, particularly in terms of 
poverty. While the debate on neoliberal economic development is often polarized into a 
model that is considered either “good” or “bad,” leading economists and social scientists 
who analyze the issue generally see shades of grey.  
However, even these researchers have considerable disagreement. While 
regression models and the use of reform indexes are often used to support or refute 
various aspects of the neoliberal model, the results are always a product of the samples 
selected and the control variables used (Indart, 2004: 7). Throughout the world and in 
Latin America in particular, the data collected is often inconsistent and incomplete across 
countries, thereby complicating analysis. Even with the same numbers and indexes, 
researchers can still reach very different conclusions depending upon the type of 
                                                
4
 It policy makers named it the Santiago Consensus because of its adoption at the 1998 Summit of the 




 Nevertheless, quantitative measures, if used in an appropriate 
manner, may still lead to important insights. However, since I intend to create an 
explanation of the relationship between neoliberal reform and levels of poverty that is 
accessible to a non-technical audience, I will limit myself to a simple analysis of 
quantifiable data. Furthermore, by analyzing variables for which only qualitative analysis 
is generally available, such as labor conditions and community autonomy, I will reveal 
insights inaccessible to mere econometric measures.  
While the first chapter of this thesis is dedicated to analyzing the overall negative 
effects of the neoliberal economic model on poverty in Latin America, the rest of the 
thesis is devoted exclusively to the case study of Costa Rica. In chapter two, I begin my 
analysis of Costa Rica by examining the country’s unique history within the context of 
Latin America as it relates to the onset of neoliberal reform. In chapter three, I study the 
possible positive and negative sources of impact on income that have resulted in an 
overall stagnation of poverty in Costa Rica, and conclude that on balance, neoliberal 
policies have held back overall poverty reduction through their promotion of unequal 
income distribution, loss of employment and changes in societal behavior. Chapter four 
then examines how neoliberal policies have created an overall unbalanced economy that 
deprives individuals of healthy long-term economic participation. Based on these 
findings it then suggests a more selective means of liberalization that is regulated by a 
more powerful state, a state that in turn empowers its people to guide development at 
both the local and national levels in order to reduce poverty. In light of these conclusions 
                                                
 
5
 See, for example, Huber and Solt (2004) and Walton (2004) in Latin American Research Review.   
 5
and the country’s short-term prospects, I conclude the thesis in chapter five by 











































II. Neoliberalism and Poverty in Latin America 
 
How neoliberal reform affects poverty in Latin America, or anywhere else in the 
world ultimately depends on how one both defines and measures poverty. Furthermore, in 
order to understand why this relationship developed in the first place, the reader must 
first understand neoliberal economic theory. In light of these two needs, I expand upon 
poverty and neoliberal economic theory respectively in the next two sections of this 
chapter before developing my argument in the third section that neoliberal economic 
development has in many ways hindered poverty reduction in Latin America. Finally, I 
end the chapter by narrowing down my focus to the impact of neoliberal economic 
development of poverty in Costa Rica in preparation for the remainder of the thesis.   
 
What is Poverty and How is it Measured?  
 
In this thesis, I am concerned with how the neoliberal economic reforms have 
affected levels of poverty in Latin America in general and Costa Rica in particular, where 
I define poverty as a lack of satisfying the basic physiological needs of individuals.
6
 One 
way to measure this poverty is to measure direct indicators of health such as hunger level, 
access to clean water, lifespan, and the presence of diseases. Nevertheless, I will 
primarily examine the nexus of neoliberalism and poverty as measured by income since 
an analysis of money not only refers to the end state of poverty, but can also be used as a 
way to help trace the causes of the condition in the first place. Even so, it is pertinent to 
reveal that even income has limited utility since one person’s poverty level as defined by 
a set income, is not necessarily the same as somebody else’s poverty level at that same 
                                                
 
6
 Physiological needs refer to physical health based needs that are necessary in order to enjoy a healthy life. 
These needs include adequate food, clean water, and freedom from sickness.   
 7
level of income. Indeed, Nobel economics laureate Amartya Sen identifies five causes of 
such disparity. They are outlined below (1999: 70-71):  
Personal heterogeneities: Everybody is different. Two people with the same 
income may vary in their personal health, abilities, age or gender. Hence, an older person 
with an illness may need more money than a young healthy person would. 
Environmental diversities: Geographic settings have influence on what people get 
out of a certain level of income. People who live in a climate prone to natural disaster, for 
example, will need more aid—monetary or otherwise—to compensate for those disasters.  
Variations in social climate: factors such as educational and healthcare 
arrangements, crime and violence as well as social capital formation in a particular 
community have an impact on the conversion of income into physiological wellbeing.  
Differences in relational perspective: the income level required for a set level of 
physiological wellbeing in different communities depends in part on established patterns 
of behavior.  
Distribution within the family: Families tend to share their incomes among 
members. How members decide to utilize this income affects the individual members in 
various ways.  
While an in-depth analysis of these causes for disparity between income and 
poverty is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is nevertheless important to keep these 
factors in mind as areas of further research for a more precise study of the topic at hand. 
While some of these sources of disparity are endogenous in nature, such as age, they are 
factors for which we can and should nevertheless compensate when searching for ways to 
reduce poverty. 
 8
Neoliberal Theory in Latin America 
 
Neoliberal theory holds that a market-led economy is necessarily better than a 
government-led economy in terms of development in general and poverty alleviation in 
particular, but the concept is both incomplete and partially flawed. The concept rides on 
the relatively simple notion of efficiency. Neoliberal theory holds that markets can more 
efficiently distribute capital, goods, and services, throughout the world than governments 
can. The driving force behind this is competition. Due to this competition, corporations 
search the world for cheap, efficient labor, offering employment to those people who 
would otherwise be worse off economically. They also provide potential for countries to 
raise the output of their exports, thereby allowing for an increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP)
7
. For these reasons, proponents of neoliberal reform recommend reducing 
barriers to foreign investment, especially foreign direct investment (FDI). This can be 
achieved by liberalizing the financial system of a government through the reduction of 
taxation on foreign companies, among other means.  
Simultaneously, while employing the poor, the cheaper labor mentioned in the 
previous paragraph translates into cheaper prices for consumers. In order to further 
reduce prices for consumers, neoliberal supporters such as the United States and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) have strongly lobbied for and succeeded to a 
considerable extent in reducing trade barriers (such as tariffs) throughout the world. 
Finally, by advocating the privatization of state-owned enterprises and by encouraging 
states to give markets (the private sector) more influence within particular industries 
                                                
7
 According to Todaro and Smith (2006), gross domestic product is the output of goods and services 
produced by the country’s economy within the country’s territory, in monetary terms by residents and non-
residents alike.   
 9
(deregulation), neoliberal proponents hope to continue this process of efficient economic 
development that in theory should benefit everybody including the poor. 
Perhaps the greatest expectation for neoliberalism in Latin America is that greater 
competition and trade will increase international demand for Latin American products 
through comparative advantage. In other words, Latin American economies, under the 
invisible hand of the market, would find competitive market niches that would allow for 
greater income through increased exports. This would simultaneously increase the need 
for employment. Further, transnational corporations would be able to provide the 
technical and managerial know-how to create more efficient and profitable business for 
everybody (Kirby, 2003: 57). 
 
Is Neoliberal Economic Development Helping the Poor Economically?  
 
 At first glance, it might appear that neoliberal reform has worked out well for 
Latin America in terms of decreasing poverty. GDP growth increased overall from the 
1980s to the 1990s from 1.2 percent to 3.3 percent (ECLAC, 2002: 32) while exports 
grew by an average of 8.9 percent per year, the fastest in the region’s history (Kirby, 
2003: 65). Meanwhile income-based poverty
8
 per household decreased from 48.3 percent 
in 1990 to 44.0 percent in 2002 (ECLAC, 2004b: 63). Along with this, the proportion of 
people living on insufficient food has declined from 13 percent (1990-1992) to 10 percent 
(2000-2002) (United Nations, 2005: 7) while life expectancy at birth has slowly increased 
(ECLAC, 2004a: 76).  
                                                
 
8
 ECLAC determines the poverty line at incomes amounting to less than twice the cost of a basic food 
basket. Likewise, the extreme poverty line is determined to be at incomes at less the cost of a basic food 
basket. Unlike the World Bank’s measure of poverty at $1 dollar a day for extreme poverty and $2 dollars a 
day for (normal) poverty, ECLAC’s measure is personalized to each country’s purchasing power and 
therefore reflects a generally higher and more accurate picture of income-based poverty in Latin America 
and throughout the world.   
 10
However, on closer inspection, these feats are not as great as they might seem. On 
the economic front GDP growth has not recovered to its originally high levels of over 
five percent in each of the three decades from 1950 to 1980 (ECLAC, 2002: 32) and from 
2000-2004
9
 the GDP growth dropped to an average of only 2.6 percent. Furthermore, 
throughout the whole period from 1990 to 2004, growth was extremely volatile from year 
to year ranging from -0.6 percent to 5.5 percent. This volatility is due in part to the 
fragility of the region’s financial systems as they increasingly integrate into the world 
economy. Such examples as the Mexican crash at the end of 1994 and Argentina’s 2002 
economic implosion stand out as stark examples.
10
  
Meanwhile, while the percentage of households
11
 in income-based poverty 
appeared to have declined overall since 1990, more recent trends from 1997 into the new 
millennium have shown a general stagnation in percentages of poverty, if not an increase 
(ECLAC, 2004b: 63). According to Kirby, poverty was worse at the turn of the century 
than it had been in 1980 (2003: 109).
12
 Likewise, as the population of Latin America has 
grown, the absolute number of people in poverty has continued to increase. While Latin 
                                                
 
9
 The figure from 2004 is based on a preliminary estimation.  
 
10
 The Mexican peso crisis was caused by artificially rising prices creating a strong investment climate and 
euphoria. This was followed by a period of distress due to the insecurity brought about by the indigenous 
Zapatista movement and democratic uncertainty among other factors. This caused a contagious panic where 
everybody pulled out his or her investment thereby creating a balance of payment crisis where more money 
was lost than gained and where the bank ran out of money. This forced Mexico to devalue the peso. In 
Argentina, the economy collapsed under the weight of rising internal fiscal and external trade deficits that 
were caused in part by linking the peso to the dollar (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 129, 690).     
 
11
 The percentage of the actual population in poverty tends to run at about 7-8 percent above household 
rates, but both increase and decrease at about the same rate. 
 
12
 Kirby’s assertion should be taken with caution since ECLAC warns that changes in the sampling of 
household surveys since 1980 could have significant impact on the number of people reported to be in 
poverty (ECLAC, 2004a: 119).   
 11
America contained 200.2 million people below the poverty line in 1990, that number 
increased to 221.4 million by 2002 (ECLAC, 2004a: 56). 
Latin America has not faired well in terms of levels of income inequality either. 
Throughout the 1990s and into the new century, the region has maintained the distinction 
of being the area with the highest levels of inequality in the world. In every country 
except Uruguay, the richest 10 percent of the population receives over 30 percent of the 
income. At the other end of the spectrum, the bottom 40 percent receives 9 to 16 percent 
of the income in all countries except Uruguay where they receive 22 percent (ECLAC, 
2004b: 339-40). Although there have been issues in being able to collect enough accurate 
data to be certain, it appears inequality in the region increased as a whole during the 
1990s under neoliberal policies (Morley, 2004: 94-99).  
This is unfortunate since income inequality often leads to economic inefficiency 
and adverse social consequences such as increases in poverty. Indeed, the rich tend to 
spend money on luxury goods from other countries and keep their money in those 
countries (capital flight), which drains a nation’s productive resources. Had the money 
stayed in the country, it could have benefited the local economy. Even within the nation, 
inequality leads to inefficient allocation of assets. For example, the rich are more likely to 
support private schools and university education at the expense of quality universal 
primary or secondary education (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 207-209). Indeed, there is a 
tendency to support one’s own social networks at the expense of the marginalized. In 
positions of power, this can lead to corruption.   
 12
Ultimately, in Latin America, the high and growing inequality reflects 
concentrated ownership of human capital,
13
 the relative scarcity of skilled labor, and the 
limited presence of skill intensive growth
14
 (Morley, 2004: 114). It also reflects the fact 
that most jobs are being created in low-wage, low-productivity sectors characterized by 
insecure conditions of employment. Indeed, ECLAC estimates that the informal sector
15
 
generates 7 out of 10 new non-agricultural jobs in the region, primarily micro enterprises 
and independent workers. In addition, while wages increased throughout the 1990s, only 
in 2000 did they finally surpass the 1980 levels (Alarcón and Zepeda, 2004: 170). To 
further compound things, unemployment showed a general increase from 5.7 percent in 
1991 to 8.5 percent in 2000. While one can blame the increase in the size of the working 
age population, such demographic growth has always been present in Latin America and 
is now starting to show signs of slowing down (ECLAC, 2004b: 71-72). Such trends in 
the labor market have lead to increased social vulnerability. According to ECLAC, “in 
the 1990s…social vulnerability took its place alongside poverty as a dominant feature in 
the lives of vast segments of the population including the middle income strata who, in 
the previous development stage, had come to symbolize upward social mobility” (2000: 
49-50). 
Furthermore, within the context of the opening up of China and other Asian 
countries to international trade, the comparative advantages of unskilled labor in Latin 
                                                
13
 Concentrated ownership of human capital reflects the idea that knowledge through advanced education 
(primarily formal), such as from a university, is only attained by a rather small sector of the population.   
 
14
 Skill intensive growth refers to economic growth based on the utilization of individuals with skills that 
require some form of advanced education.  
 
15
 The informal sector, also known as the informal economy covers a range of economic activities including 
self-employed workers, domestic services, microenterprises, and unpaid workers in family enterprises. The 
informal economy tends to pay lower wages than the formal economy and does not necessarily adhere to 
minimum wages.  
 13
America continue to decline. To compensate for this unfortunate effect of liberalization, 
countries are forced to rely more on the advantages of their natural resources (if they 
have these) to turn out profits (Altimir, 2004: 135). However, while this may increase 
GDP, it also continues to exploit workers.   
Given this bleak outlook, one may very well ask how direct indicators of poverty 
such as a decline in hunger and less direct indicators such as increased lifespan have 
come to unfold. The biggest factor involved was probably an increase in social spending 
during the 1990s. As ECLAC makes clear in its 2001 Social Panorama of Latin America: 
 
The greater effort made by Latin American countries to allocate more public 
resources to social sectors in the 1990s resulted in a sizeable increase (around 
50%) in per capita social spending. Although much of this rise was due to the 
reactivation of economic growth, especially during the first half of the decade, it 
is significant that around two fifths of it stemmed from the reallocation of public 
revenues for social purposes and a smaller part, around one fifth, from increased 
resources for the public budget. As a result, the percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) devoted to social sectors climbed from 10.4% to 13.1% (116).  
 
While increased social spending (not a part of the neoliberal model) has helped the poor, 
it is only one method of doing so and must be complemented with a more complete 
economic and social development scheme to be truly helpful in the long run. If not, Latin 
America would inevitably fall into unsustainable debt, perhaps similar in size to the one 
neoliberal structural adjustment and international loans helped to alleviate in the 1980s.   
Although neoliberal reform has helped reduce national debt (particularly external 
debt), it has, on balance, increased the debt of individual citizens by helping to create a 
culture of consumerism. Although neoliberal reform helps connect countries with each 
other by increasing the rate at which they import and export culture, knowledge, goods 
and services, these resources are very unevenly distributed across the population creating 
 14
a sense of relative disparity both on a national and international level, especially in urban 
areas. Due to marketing and advertising, people want what they cannot afford in order to 
fit in with what is perceived to be a socially superior class, a class that is associated with 
increased power and happiness. One result, especially in light of credit-card citizenship,
16
 
is debt, which in turn leads to an increased risk of poverty. Unfortunately, the money 
which was spent will very often line the coffers of multinational corporations rather than 
staying inside the country. This in turn aggravates inequality and poverty in the region.  
A culture of consumerism in a region of inequality has probably also increased 
the crime rate in the region. However, crime, whether or not it is in order to simply stay 
out of poverty, has a myriad of negative consequences. For example, it may demoralize 
the labor force, cause corruption and produce fear among business owners, and help 
create economic instability, which in turn can hurt economic growth and the potential for 
greater poverty alleviation.  
Perhaps one of the most well known implementations of neoliberal reform in 
Latin America is that of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 
Mexico and the U.S. and Canada. Put into effect in 1994, NAFTA has been a general 
disappointment in terms of poverty alleviation. Mexican agriculture provides the best 
example that simply creating market access to the U.S. economy will not automatically 
advance major development goals, but instead may actually work against them. While 
access to the U.S. market for Mexican fruits and vegetables led to a 50 percent growth in 
the horticultural sector under NAFTA, it came at the heavier cost of the country losing its 
national markets to cheap imports, most notably corn. As a result, a very few number of 
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 The term credit-card citizenship refers to belonging to a society in which the individual in essence buys 
their identity and acceptance within a society (social status) by living off credit.   
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large farmers have benefited from the export of fruit and vegetables while grain imports 
have devastated thousands of farmers throughout the country. In fact, nearly two million 
farmers have left the land since the start of NAFTA, but few have found other quality 
employment, leaving 18 million living on less than two dollars a day (Carlsen, 2005: 2). 
In a society where many of the poor aspire to the lifestyle of the rich it would not be 
surprising to find more than a few of these impoverished ex-farmers trying to spend 
beyond their means and turning to crime in frustration.     
Sobering as this analysis may be, neoliberal reforms have not been completely 
negative in a relative sense. Indeed, while countries with aggressive reforms and with a 
relatively high growth rates may not necessarily lead to reduced poverty and inequality, 
blocked reformers with poor growth (such as Venezuela, Paraguay and Ecuador) have 
only increased their poverty and inequality (Kirby, 2003: 123). This supports the 
conclusion that while neoliberal development may not on balance be very helpful in 
alleviating poverty, there nevertheless exists aspects to this form of development that do 
have positive effects. Even so, what are ultimately needed are pro-poor and pro-
vulnerable growth strategies of development that reduce inequality. 
Neoliberalism in Costa Rica       
 
The discrimination inherent in neoliberalism which results in inequality and 
sustained poverty is primarily a systemic problem which takes on a life of its own, but is 
fueled by the needs and desire of individuals and the actions or omission of the state and 
international agencies. Despite the negative consequences of neoliberalism in terms of 
poverty alleviation, various aspects of this economic development scheme may still be 
beneficial in a broader developmental context that includes strategic social spending, 
 16
transparency and efficient organization among and between public institutions, private 
enterprises, international agencies, non-governmental organizations and ordinary citizens. 
However, there is no one solution to alleviating poverty. What works in one country or 
community may not work in another due to local realities, something orthodox neoliberal 
policy fails to understand. 
In the following chapters, I will examine the effect of neoliberal economic 
development on poverty in Costa Rica. As one of the least poor countries in Latin 
America, Costa Rica might be seen as evidence of the success of neoliberal economic 
development. However, such a perception is, on balance, misleading. In Costa Rica, 
neoliberal economic policies leave many people poor through uneven growth. Ultimately, 
however, in its attempts to reduce poverty in an atmosphere of increasing neoliberal 
globalization, Costa Rica should continue to liberalize select aspects of its economy 
while strengthening social services for the poor and vulnerable. At the same time, the 
state should try to link these disadvantaged people into fruitful niches of the international 
and domestic economies while simultaneously increasing their social and political 
participation in development. In the end, in order for economic development to 
complement poverty reduction, the state, as a democratic entity, should have more rather 












III. Exploring the Rise of Neoliberalism in a Country of Relatively Low Poverty 
  
In the Beginning… 
 
At a quick glance, Costa Rica could be seen as a country that successfully 
implemented neoliberal reforms, not only because of its economic performance, but also 
because of its low poverty rate in Latin America. In 2002 for example, while the whole of 
Latin America had a 44 percent poverty rate, Costa Rica remained at less than half that 
average (ECLAC, 2004: 119). However, Costa Rica’s relatively low level of poverty in 
the region is arguably due more to its unique historical heritage from before the 
neoliberal reforms. 
 To begin with, the country consists of an area demographically and economically 
unique since the beginning of colonization. Although called the “rich coast” in Spanish, 
Spain found the country of little economic significance. There were few Indians on the 
land and little if any gold to be found. Consequently, there was no wealthy oligarchy. 
During the nineteenth century, many family farms began cultivating coffee and exporting 
the crop to Europe. This economic activity created an unusually large middle class for the 
time (Skidmore and Smith, 2005: 371). However, we must not confuse the middle class 
of then with the middle class of now. There were no sources of employment except a 
small military and political administration. Instead, Costa Rica was a land of independent 
farmers, artisans and merchants. Consequently, each family worked hard for a livelihood, 
although sometimes with the mutual support that came with community solidarity 
(Desanti, 2003: 246-47).     
Later, in the beginning of the twentieth century, the United Fruit Company began 
creating banana plantations in Costa Rica. However, because of the better pay associated 
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with the small coffee plantations and the sparsely populated land, scarce labor was hard 
to find. Consequently, Nicaraguans and Jamaicans were brought over to fill the labor gap 
(Pérez, 2004: 32-33). Nonetheless, by 1925 only four percent of the population consisted 
of blacks, while about 80 percent of the population were white, 14 percent were mestizo 
and a meager one percent Indian (Skidmore and Smith, 2005: 371). Unlike other Central 
American countries, Costa Rica did not have an abundant labor force of Indians and other 
proletariat to tax, put in debt and ultimately exploit (Pérez, 2004: 32-33). Hence, from the 
beginning Costa Rica did not develop the severe social stratification that led most other 
Central and South American countries into a situation of extreme inequality and poverty. 
 
The Boom between Crashes   
 
However, Costa Rica like all the other Latin American exporters at the time was 
not immune to the crises of other countries. As a result, the stock market crash of 1929 
created pay cuts among laborers, who then complemented their work with subsistence 
farming on their land, a luxury not available in more densely populated areas such as El 
Salvador (Pérez, 2004: 32-33). Nevertheless, this gave rise to social discontent and a 
progressive social security system and labor code were put in place in the 1940s and 
upheld and strengthened in the 1950s (Itzigsohn, 2000: 38). In 1948, Costa Rica 
abolished its army and levied new taxes. Throughout the 1950s, Costa Rica expanded its 
agricultural production and signed a new contract with the United Fruit Company that 
increased the state’s share of the profits from 10 to 30 percent (Skidmore and Smith, 
2005: 371).   
By the 1960s, Costa Rica jumped onto the Latin American bandwagon and 
implemented Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), an economic policy popular 
 19
throughout the region from the 1950s through the 1970s. The concept of the ISI economy 
was to displace the production of imported goods with local goods in order for Latin 
American countries to respond to an increasing trade debt with Europe and the United 
States. In essence, the governments increased tariffs on particular goods in order to 
protect infant industries and attempted more regionalized trading. As a result of all this, 
Latin American governments played a strong role in the national economy.  
In Costa Rica, the state played an especially large role. During the ISI years, the 
state grew in size and began employing large sections of the population. Between 1950 
and 1973, public employment grew at an average yearly rate of 6.7 percent (Pérez, 2004: 
37). This caused a massive urbanization movement, the growth of a large urban middle 
class and a considerable reduction in poverty. In fact, poverty dropped from 50 percent in 
1960 to 19 percent in 1980. During the same years, the average years of schooling for the 
population of adults 25 years and older increased from 3.6 to 5.9 (Proyecto Estado de la 
Nación, 2004: 398). Relatively low inequality in wealth and income before ISI, and the 
large welfare state
17
 during ISI, along with a culture of peace, liberty and democracy, 
helped make Costa Rica stand out from the rest of Latin America before the onset of 
neoliberalism.    
However, the welfare state of Costa Rica and the rest of Latin America fell into a 
huge economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. The root of this problem lies in the 
ISI model, but exogenous world events made for a much more acute catastrophe. In 
essence, Latin American countries ended up relying on imported capital goods from 
industrialized nations in order to produce manufactured goods. However, the steep prices 
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 The state’s emphasis on a strong and affordable health care system, free and compulsory elementary 
education, and public employment are what make it stand out as a welfare state.  
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generally induced heavy borrowing and debt, as in the case of the Costa Rican state, and 
often severely limited production and job growth. The debt of Latin American countries 
increased as world prices for agricultural and other basic products steadily declined. 
Furthermore, the 1979 increase in oil prices exacerbated increasing deficits while the 
early 1980s saw the elimination of the Central American market as a destination for 
Costa Rican products (Itzigsohn, 2000: 52). In Costa Rica, as elsewhere, the informal 
urban economy began to grow as a result, creating a population vulnerable to the 
unfavorable conditions of the world economy.  
As early as 1979, in response to the building crisis, a business sector of the Costa 
Rican National Association of Economic Promotion (ANFE)
18
 supported a series of 
neoliberal reforms that the World Bank would endorse the following year. Their 
proposals included limiting the function of the state and its growth through such means as 
privatization, reducing tariffs, and the elimination of business taxes to promote foreign 
direct investment. However, disagreements between and within political parties and 
social sectors of society failed to establish any immediate agreement on if, and to what 
extent, these reforms should be implemented (Altmann, 1998: 131-132). However, as the 
debt crisis worsened and interest rates rose for international borrowing at the beginning 
of the 1980s, Costa Rica came to enough of a political consensus to yield to the will of 
international monetary lending agencies and follow their prescribed structural adjustment 
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The Recovery and Ensuing Neoliberal Policies   
 
In 1985, Costa Rica signed its first of two structural adjustment loans with the 
World Bank. (Trejos, 1999: 25). One of the main concepts behind these loans was to 
restructure the economy by lowering protection for local industries, reduce subsidies for 
agricultural products, and further promote exports beyond the Central American market, 
especially the United States. In a gradual fashion, Costa Rica implemented these ideas. 
The government imposed new policies to more deeply insert itself into the world 
economy by promoting new sectors of growth of goods and services that it could use to 
sell to developed nations. These sectors of growth began with nontraditional agriculture 
exports, expanded to tourism and assembly manufacturing (maquilas), and later included 
the high technology industry (Itzigsohn, 2000: 52).  
Export Free Zones or just Free Zones (FZs) were one of the tools the Costa Rican 
government created in order to develop these areas of growth. In particular, FZs offer 
duty-free imports, and a variety of tax exemptions, most importantly for profits. In 
response to the initial failure of FZs, legislation was enhanced, allowing for private 
operators in 1984 and in 1990 to include service provisions as well, thereby increasing 
foreign autonomy and the types of transnational businesses allowed in the zones 
respectively.  These significant changes in turn brought increased investment in the zones 
and through investment, success. Ultimately, FZs have provided incentives for 
transnational corporations to bring their businesses to the country and foster export led 
growth (Paus, 2005: 140). One of the major results has been that these businesses have 
provided new types of jobs for Costa Ricans. Large national companies have also been 
able to take advantage of the new markets. By diversifying its markets and products, 
 22
Costa Rica has created a more stable economic base than it would have otherwise (under 
the export growth model). In addition, by reducing subsidies for the agricultural industry, 
the government has lessened its expenditures in the face of public debt. At the same time, 
lowering protectionist tariffs for local industries has allowed consumers to purchase 
products, especially agricultural products, at lower international prices.  
Also, during the 1980s, the state was able to continue pursing its welfare policies, 
although to a somewhat limited extent, primarily because of U.S. foreign aid, part of 
which was in the form of geopolitical rent.
19
  However, the Reagan administration, in 
power during this time, also wanted to showcase Costa Rica as a country that thrived with 
an increasing capitalistic and liberalizing market economy, and therefore spared the 
country the worst of the structural adjustments in order to achieve this image. 
Nevertheless, the money was subject to several conditions, namely: privatization of 
public companies, the deregulation of the banking system, and the creation of institutions 
that paralleled state functions. With the defeat of the Sandinistas, U.S. aid dried up in 
1990 (Itzigsohn, 2000: 54). This was unfortunate in terms of funding for social policies, 
but at least by that time Costa Rica had worked its way out of a massive external debt.   
Initially, a large portion of the aid, which totaled 3.15 percent of Costa Rica’s 
GDP between 1982 and 1990, was used for balance of payments support
20
 which enabled 
Costa Rica to come out of the recession earlier than most other Latin American countries. 
The U.S. later financed the growth of the private banking sector in the late 1980s. 
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 Costa Rica allowed the United States to use its land as a staging ground against the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua. This was likely part of the reason the U.S. favored Costa Rica with money.  
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 A country’s balance of payments shows its financial transactions with the outside world. When a country 
is in a lot of debt to the outside world, it often accepts aid to reduce that debt, thereby supporting a healthier 
balance of payments.  
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Additional aid was used to create new institutions, perhaps most importantly the Costa 
Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE),
21
 in charge of attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The U.S. also established the Ministry of Exports in 1986 and 
covered its costs for the first three years of operation. The fact that the U.S. was the 
brainchild behind CINDE (and other institutions) is particularly relevant here because as 
Paus explains, “building CINDE outside the existing structure of government institutions 
allowed continuation of policy direction irrespective of the government in power, which 
constitutes a major challenge for FDI-led development in Costa Rica in the early twenty-
first century” (2005: 142). Indeed, the export-led growth model imposed upon and taken 
up by Costa Rica through a large increase in FDI has benefited the wealthy while 
ignoring vast segments of the population, thereby increasing inequality while sustaining 
poverty as we shall see later.  
While institutions supporting FDI development sprang up, those that supported 
smaller scale development of small and medium businesses with more of a local focus 
disappeared. In particular, this began with the government privatization of the Costa 
Rican Development Corporation (CODESA)
22
 in 1990. CODESA was established in 
1972 and expanded the role of government from regulator to producer (Paus, 2005: 138). 
Its purpose was to create a more diversified economy and more aggressive business class. 
However, faced with the failure of many of these businesses and the ideological onset of 
neoliberalism, it never stood a chance of revitalization. In this way, the participation of 
the state was reduced. The government favored the reduction of the fiscal deficit through 
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the selling of public enterprises, but at the cost of public investment. Consequently, cash 
strapping the government has hindered the effectiveness of social services (Fallas, 2005: 
298). Nevertheless, the new economic strategy, with the blessing of a strong enough 
world economy at the time (except for a recession in 1991, which temporarily increased 
poverty [Sauma, 2004: 5]) created enough economic growth and employment 
opportunities to lower the poverty levels to 20 percent by 1994 (Fallas, 2005: 299). Since 
the mid 1990’s, however, the neoliberal economic model as implemented in Costa Rica
23
 
has shown signs of exhaustion and ineffectiveness.       
Ultimately, the United States and other international lending agencies led and 
coerced Costa Rica into implementing neoliberal policies during the 1980s. However, 
with reduced aid from the U.S. and the creation of a dynamic export led growth model 
divorced from vast segments of a stagnating economy, the result has been an increase in 
inequality and stagnation in poverty levels in recent years.
24
 Since the 1990s this issue 
has remained at the forefront of politics in Costa Rica, which has, at least in part, lead to 
the creation of an unhealthy mix of political reshuffling and legislative bottlenecks as 
politicians struggle to find the best way to solve this multifaceted problem, a problem that 
has only been further compounded with a culture of consumerism also of neoliberal 
economic origin.   
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 By 1995, Costa Rica had implemented neoliberal policies (as dictated by the Washington Consensus) to 
about the same extend as the average Latin American country as measured by reform indexes for key areas 
of implementation (Paus, 2005: 140).   
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 In Costa Rica, the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), the original source of all income-
based poverty levels cited in this thesis unless stated otherwise, defines the poverty line as based on a basic 
food basket (an established list of staple foods considered the minimum necessary for a families survival) 
and the cost of some non-food necessities. Households whose income falls at or below the cost of the basic 
food basket are considered to be in extreme poverty. The poverty line for rural areas is lower than that of 
urban areas based on differences in lifestyle.  Note also that the percentages cited for poverty are based on 
households, rather than individuals or families, unless otherwise explicitly stated.     
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IV. Why Poverty is Stagnating: A Look at the Winners and Losers of the Neoliberal 
Economic Model in Costa Rica 
 
In Costa Rica, since 1994, poverty has stagnated at around 20 percent of 
households with the percentage of people in rural poverty higher than the percentage of 
people in urban poverty (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 408-09). In 2005, the last 
year for which data is available, 21.2 percent of Costa Ricans households were in 
poverty
25
 including 5.6 percent in extreme poverty (INEC, 2005b: 2). Given these 
statistics, it is natural to ask why poverty has not decreased.  
Many Costa Ricans blame immigrants, particularly Nicaraguans, as one of the 
reasons for stagnating poverty levels. Between 1984 and 2000, the number of residents of 
Nicaraguan origin increased from 1.9 percent to 5.9 percent of the national population
26
 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 76). According to popular belief and initial 
intuition, one might assume that almost all immigrating Nicaraguans are poor and 
searching for a better life. After all, Nicaragua has one of the highest poverty rates in all 
of Latin America while Costa Rica has one of the lowest. However, the average 
Nicaraguan immigrant has one more year of schooling than the average Nicaraguan and 
two years less than the average Costa Rican (Vargas, 2004: 6). Not too surprisingly then, 
the percentage of Nicaraguan heads of households in condition of poverty only averaged 
six percent higher than the Costa Rican born average between 1997 and 2003 (Vargas, 
2004: 9). Given the relatively small numbers of Nicaraguan immigrants who enter the 
country per year relative to the size of the population at large, and given that the 
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 Includes extreme poverty 
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 During this same period, the overall percentage of foreigners grew from 3.7 percent to 7.8 percent.   
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difference in poverty level between the different nationalities is not that extreme, the 
impact of Nicaraguan immigration on poverty in Costa Rica is almost negligible.
27
  
Another factor that needs to be analyzed is minimum wage, especially in 
comparison with the cost of the basic food basket. From 1995 to 1999, both of these rose 
(at a similar pace) faster than the rate of inflation. Then from 1999 to 2003, minimum 
wage stagnated while the cost of the basic food basket decreased slightly (relative to 
inflation) (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 167). However, poverty did not appear to 
be especially sensitive to these changes. Other factors then must be contradicting such 
trends.     
Perhaps demographics can help explain things. Shifting demographics have also 
been hypothesized as contributing significantly to the stagnation in poverty, especially 
since the proportion of older Costa Ricans has been increasing relative to the population 
as a whole due to lowering fertility rates.
28
 However, Costa Rican social scientists Jorge 
Barquero and Juan Diego Trejos have ruled out the possibility of demographics being the 
cause of increased poverty because the increase in the proportion of the older population 
is offset by decreases in the percentage of households that are in stages of the household 
lifecycle where poverty is greatest, especially the expansion stage
29
 (Barquero and 
Trejos, 2005). What then is causing this stagnation in poverty? Is it changes in education 
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 If we were to assume that from 1994 to 2005, the same percentage of immigrants came in per year as 
between 1984 and 2000, and that the average difference in poverty between Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans 
was 6 percent from 1994 to 2005, just as the head of households were from 1997 to 2003 (and if we ignore 
the immigrant population from countries besides Nicaragua), then we can conclude that Nicaraguan 
immigration contributed to about a 0.17 percent increase in poverty from 1994 to 2005. (0.06x0.25=0.0150 
and 0.0150x11 years=0.17).     
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 The fertility rate has gone down for the poor and non-poor alike.  
 
29
 The expansion stage refers the part of the household lifecycle when the number of children in the 
household increases due to their births.  
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or social spending? How about the economy? While many factors are at play and not 
everything can be accounted for down to a science, I nevertheless build a case that the 
most significant neoliberal reforms in Costa Rica on balance are not alleviating poverty 




In 1990, Costa Rica made a strong commitment to integrate itself into the world 
economy by joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
30
 Since then, 
the government has signed several Free Trade Agreements with countries such as 
Mexico, Canada and the Dominican Republic thereby expanding trade. In general, the 
neoliberal model has promoted considerable economic growth for Costa Rica. Distancing 
ourselves a little from the crisis of the early 1980s, we see that the average yearly growth 
of gross domestic product (GDP) was a solid 4.3% between 1994 and 2003, higher than 
the average for Latin America (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 158). In October 
2005 The Tico Times, reported that Costa Rica was the number one exporter per capita in 
Latin America (Kimitch, 2005b: 4). However, such a superficial look at the country tells 
us little about the well-being of its people.  
Taking a closer look, we see that the average rate of real growth of gross domestic 
product per person was a meager 1.9 percent between 1993 and 2002 (Proyecto Estado de 
la Nación, 2004: 152). This offers us our first evidence of an economy with uneven 
growth, growth that does not easily reach the pocketbooks of the nation’s people. 
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 In 1995, GATT became known as the World Trade Organization.  
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However, averages are deceptive. According to the gini coefficient,
31
 Costa Rica’s 
inequality steadily increased (with stagnation in the last couple of years) from .374 in 
1990 to .425 in 2003 (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 409). Not surprisingly then, 
we see that in 1990 the richest fifth of the population had 8.35 times greater income than 
the poorest fifth of the population and that by 2002, this disparity had increased to 11.59 
times more income among the richest fifth as compared to the poorest fifth (Proyecto 
Estado de la Nación, 2004: 98). If we had a measure for wealth (a person’s net worth), we 
would probably find that inequality to be much more severe. Obviously then, some Costa 
Ricans are not benefiting as much as others from the new opening up of the economy, or 
perhaps not at all. 
 
The Upper Class versus a Slipping Middle Class 
  
During ISI, new social groups in combination with the government took on the 
tasks of starting businesses, especially in manufacturing and expanding production and 
employment. However, in the present era of neoliberal economic policies, those who are 
already wealthy are the ones who have the means to commit themselves to the main two 
new economically lucrative areas of business: private financial activities (especially in 
tourism where one can invest in hotels and the service economy) and the exportation of 
non-traditional products. These individuals are consolidating among themselves and with 
foreign investors to reap great economic benefits from the country (Villasuso, 2003, 336). 
Their lifestyle entails the luxuries of gated communities, private clubs, and expensive 
private education for their children. 
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 The gini coefficient is an aggregate numerical measure of income inequality which varies between 0 
(perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). This means the higher the coefficient, the greater the inequality 
in the income distribution; likewise, the lower the value, the more equitable the distribution.   
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Meanwhile, large segments of the middle class, especially farmers and small and 
medium sized business owners, are increasingly unable to sell their products or services 
within the national market because of outside competition through economically more 
efficient large businesses within the country and because of cheaper imports. At the same 
time, these same individuals are not able to sufficiently link up with larger export 
businesses to become profitable on the world market. Probably partly as a result of this, 
the country has seen a rapid increase in the number of university students trying to 
become professionals. To take meet demand, unregulated private universities have sprung 
up and granted overvalued professional titles such as lawyer or dentist. As the labor 
market for these positions becomes saturated, the result will increasingly be 
underemployment. Furthermore, the state, which once employed a large portion of 
professionals, is also decreasing in relative size (Villasuso, 2003: 332). 
 
The Loss of the Traditional Farmer and an Ensuing Culture of Poverty  
 
As alluded to earlier, the groups that have been forced out of business and in some 
cases into poverty include the small and medium sized farmers who have traditionally 
provided rice, beans, sugar, meat and other basic agricultural products to an internal 
(national) market. In light of reduced state support and falling tariff rates for imports, 
these farmers have become susceptible to international competition to feed the domestic 
market, especially cheaper U.S. imports (thanks to subsidies) (Vargas, 2003: 276). This is 
part of a larger trend in which the average tariff rate for the country at large fell from 
slightly over 60 percent in 1985 to 11.7 percent in 1995 to 5.8 percent in 2004 (Paus, 
2005: 138). As a result, there has been a relative loss of employment in the agricultural 
sector. In addition to that, however, it is important to know if those displaced farmers 
 30
have moved on to other activities from which they can improve or at least maintain their 
previous incomes. According to the Proyecto Estado de la Nación, among the employed 
poor in 1994,
32
 42.3 percent were in activities pertaining to agriculture or livestock while 
37.7 percent were employed informally (two mutually exclusive categories). In 2003, 
while the percentage of employed poor dedicated to agricultural labors declined to 37.1 
percent, the percentage of employed poor who worked in the informal labor market 
increased to 44.5 percent. Given the relatively low wages in the informal labor market 
(that don’t follow the logic of minimum wages), this trend suggests that cheaper 
imports
33
 have increased poverty among this segment of the population (2004: 163).   
While it is true that Costa Ricans can feed themselves with less money given the 
cheaper imports, such a strategy discriminates against the welfare of farmers, not only in 
an economic sense, but also in a cultural-historical sense. Ultimately, by destroying what 
the traditional Costa Rican farmer stands for, neoliberalism is also undermining a deep-
rooted historical identity shared by the population at large, and ultimately the peoples’ 
sovereignty. Losing such a source of pride and identity while a culture of consumerism is 
imported into the country, has had grave consequences for Costa Ricans. In particular, I 
think it makes them more likely to spend money beyond their means, creating a lifestyle 
that is much more susceptible to poverty, although poverty not so much in terms of 
income, but rather in terms of purchasing power.  
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 For our purposes here, the employed poor are broken up into the following three categories: non-




 Imported goods grew from 11 percent of the total goods consumed in the country in 1991 to 19 percent 
of the total goods consumed in 1998 (Fallas, 2003: 305) due to decreasing tariffs.  
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Nevertheless, the variable nature of income in Costa Rica, as demonstrated by a 
study completed by Pablo Slon Montero and Edwin Zuñiga Rojas using statistics from 
the Costa Rican Multiple Purpose Household Survey, makes spending beyond one’s 
means just that much more of an issue. In their thesis, Slon and Zuñiga analyzed the 
magnitude of household movements from poor to not poor and from not poor to poor for 
the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. Ultimately, they determined that over these three years, 
37 percent of the population was poor at least once. Given that the national Household 
Survey used for this study is the same one that has shown a general stagnation in poverty 
levels since 1994, one can safely conclude that a large portion of the population is 
vulnerable to poverty (Castro, 2004: 12). In an increasingly consumerist society, such a 
statistic is sobering. 
 
Family Breakdown and Increased Crime in an Age of Economic Reform: Who’s 
benefiting? 
  
Another trend that parallels and is likely induced in part by the consumerist 
tendencies that accompany the neoliberal model is the break up of the traditional two-
parent family. Between 1987 and 2002, the number of two-parent households with 
children (and without extended family) dropped from 56.1 percent to 49.7 percent 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 78). The recent increase in women-headed 
households among the poor and non-poor alike reflects that the women are left with the 
burden of raising their children on their own as the male abandons the relationship and 
responsibility. Indeed, according to the SIPO database,
34
 during 2000-2001, 89 percent of 
                                                
 
34
 The SIPO database has been assembled by the Mixed Institute of Social Help (IMAS) in 1999-2001 on 
the basis of a census of poor areas -urban and rural- previously identified by poverty maps made by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). By mid-2001, the database contained 207,000 families 
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male heads in extreme poverty had a spouse while only 8 percent of female heads under 
the same conditions did. These percentages became less imbalanced at 80 percent and 12 
percent respectively for heads in near poverty and probably despite becoming more 
balanced at higher income levels, such percentages likely remain imbalanced at all 
economic income levels (World Bank, 2003: 23). Given this likelihood that female-
headed households are probably single-parent households, and that single parents have a 
harder time economically raising children, especially among poorer families, I conclude 
that the increase in the number of female-headed households is a contributor to an 
increase in poverty.
35
 In 1997, the number of female-headed households was 20.7 
percent. This number increased steadily each year to 27 percent in 2005 according to the 
Costa Rican National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). The parallel trend among 
poor households is of greater concern. In 1997, INEC reported that females headed 27.1 
percent of poor households. By 2005, this percentage had steadily increased to 33.5 
percent. As might be expected, the numbers tell an even starker tale for households in 
extreme poverty where the percentage increased from 31.4 percent to 43.5 percent during 
the same period (INEC, 2005b).  
One hypothesis that accounts for this change is that males, under new pressures to 
obtain the lifestyle of the higher social strata, are willing to abandon their families (or 
impregnate their partners and leave them). There is an imported “American Dream” in 
Costa Rica, which is communicated repeatedly to the poor through such means as 
                                                                                                                                            
or 808,500 people. It contains information on sociodemographic and labor force characteristics including 
age, education, kinship relations among household members, civil status, activity, work type, and income. 
It also contains housing characteristics and coverage of many social programs provided by government 
agencies (World Bank, 2003: 173).    
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 Aggravating the situation even more is the fact that women earn about 5 percent less than their male 
counterparts in public employment and about 25 percent less under private employment (Ruiz, 2002: 132).   
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television and newspapers, which equate that type of lifestyle with happiness. The only 
way to achieve that lifestyle is with money. If the money is not spent on raising a family, 
one could more easily pursue that dream. However, the result, especially for the poor, is a 
man who sacrifices his children’s (and partner’s) prospects of escaping poverty while 
simultaneously destroying the social nucleus of the Costa Rican culture. Also troubling, 
is the prospect that someone who avoids the responsibility of a family may be more likely 
to commit a crime. 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons crime, particularly urban crime, has risen since 
the 1980s. Walking around the country’s capital, San José, or the outlying suburbs, 
barred windows and barbed wire fencing are amenities to almost all buildings. Most 
people know somebody who has been robbed at gunpoint or knifepoint. Talking to people 
who have lived in the country all their lives, one learns that Costa Rica never used to be 
that way before the neoliberal reforms.
36
 From 1990 to 2003, the reported assault rate 
against life increased from 118 to 158 per 100,000 inhabitants.  Reported sexual assaults 
have increased from 52.3 to 102.4 per 100,000 inhabitants during the same time period 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 423). The actual numbers are in all probability 
significantly higher. Probably in part because of these trends, the rich are increasingly 
segregating themselves from the poor, especially in urban areas. Gated communities are 
becoming more and more common, even among the middle class.  
Meanwhile, the poor who live in overcrowded communities or shantytowns 
toward the outskirts of cities are at a disadvantage in virtually every respect. The story of 
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 These observations are based on personal observation from living in San José for five months. I knew 
two people who were robbed at gun or knife point during my stay, and a few others who had been assaulted 
in general during their lives inside the country.   
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Julia Peréz as given by the Tico Times is a good example of many of the issues the poor 
face. Peréz has five children living with her, including one daughter with two babies. The 
fathers offer no economic support. Her family survives on the sale of lottery tickets that 
some days bring in as little as US $2 or nothing at all. They receive some money from 
charity as well as government support that amounts to almost nothing according to Peréz. 
She said she used to clean houses and wash clothes, but she does not want to work all day 
because she is afraid of leaving the home unprotected. The door has no lock and the 
windows lack bars or glass. The family’s possessions consist primarily of a small 
television, a worn out couch, an unstable table, a broken refrigerator and a few pots 
donated by neighbors and family. From the family’s small income, they have to pay for 
food as well as water and electricity bills. Even school for the children costs money. 
Despite the country’s free education system, students must buy uniforms and pay about 
US $1 a month for costs such as photocopies (Kimitch, 2005c: 1,6). 
 
Factoring in Public Social Spending and Education 
 
At this point, we might well ask what role the state has had in poverty reduction 
so that we get a clearer idea as to what extent neoliberal economic policies leave many 
people poor through uneven growth. Perhaps the most telling statistic
37
 is that from 1990 
to 2002 we see an increase in public social spending
38
 per capita (inflation held constant) 
of 21.4 percent. In particular, there is an 8.1 percent increase in the health sector which 
likely contributed to the 25 percent drop in infant mortality and the increase in average 
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 Public social spending includes the following sectors: education, health, social security, land and 
housing, and culture and recreation.  
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lifespan from 76.87 years to 78.51 years during the same period. There was also a 40.4 
percent increase in social security aid. Although there is a 6.8 percent decrease in the land 
and housing sector of public social spending (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 93, 
399), the net effect on poverty ought to be positive. Although the distribution and impact 
of public social spending is arguably far from perfect, the Proyecto Estado de la Nación 
statistically verifies that this spending has reduced the inequality created by economic 
growth because it helps the poor proportionately more than it helps the rich (97-98). 
Hence, we now have a starker picture of the effects of the neoliberal model. 
It is also important to note that the percent of social public spending per capita 
increased 36 percent between 1990 and 2002 in real terms (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 
2004: 93). However, because it takes considerable time to see the effects of increased 
spending on education in the reduction of poverty, such spending cannot be counted 
against the exclusionary neoliberal model of economic growth as other forms of social 
spending more readily can. Nevertheless, the increase in the average number of years of 
education among the poorest fifth of the population (18 years of age and older) from 4.5 
years in 1990 to 5.1 years in 2003 (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 99), 
demonstrates that poverty still stagnated despite a more educated work force among the 
poor.
39
 This may be in part because the world standard in education is rising faster than 
the increase in education of the poor in Costa Rica.
40
 With the rise of the Asian Tigers in 
the world economy, this hypothesis appears realistic.  
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 The percent increase in education among non-poor sectors of the population was greater (Proyecto 
Estado de la Nación, 2004: 166), thereby helping to increase inequality.   
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 The lack of social spending on education in the 1980s may also be partly to blame.  
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Employing the Poor: A Case Study of the Pineapple Industry 
 
Interestingly, since the onset of the more liberalized economy around fifteen to 
twenty years ago in Costa Rica, we see that the informal job market, which provides low 
and unstable wages, has grown faster than the formal economy (provided in large part by 
transnationals) which has consistently higher wages (Kimitch, 2005b: 4). This is due in 
part to the relative decrease of formal employment in both agriculture and public 
employment. It also suggests that the relatively high labor standards and pay in Costa 
Rica (compared to other countries in the region) do not attract many transnational 
corporations, especially in areas that require little education, such as the maquila
41
 
industry. Of course, if the poor had had higher skill and educational levels relative to 
minimum wage and labor standards, then it would have been more likely to see the 
formal economy grow at a faster pace. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that 
while the formal economy has higher wages overall, the wages for the poorest people in 
the formal economy may even be lower than many of the incomes in the informal 
economy.  
Indeed, the minimum wage in Costa Rica, while strong in comparison to its 
Central American counterparts, is today similar in real terms to the minimum wage of the 
mid 1980s when the country was still hurting from the crisis (Kimitch, 2005b: 4). This 
demonstrates a complete lack of correlation between minimum wage and economic 
growth. A case in point is the pineapple industry. Pineapple had, for the first few years of 
this decade, wrestled with coffee for the number two spot on the list of export crops and 
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surpassed it in 2003 (Goodier, 2005a: 1).
42
 The fact that pineapple exports grossed $121 
million in 2000, $257 million in 2004 and $214.5 million in the first six months of 2005 
(Goodier, 2005a: 10) only underscores the growing success of the pineapple industry. 
However, this success does not translate to quality employment for the vast 
majority of the industry’s 14,000 workers (Goodier, 2005b: 20). The minimum wage for 
these peasants is a meager $8.60 per day (Goodier, 2005b: 20). If one were to assume that 
a person works an average of 23 days a month harvesting pineapple, then that person’s 
income is $197.80 per month. As of the end of 2004, the poverty line for urban and rural 
areas per person per month was $80 and $63 dollars respectively (Kimitch, 2004: 5). 
Consequently, it appears that Costa Rica’s minimum wage is quite high. In reality, 
however, the poor often work these jobs. Poor families, which averaged 4.4 family 
members in 2003 with an average of 1.0 members economically active, (Proyecto Estado 
de la Nación, 2004: 108) means that the demographically average poor family with the 
father working a minimum wage job, earns about $45 per family member per month, an 
income which is closer to the extreme rural poverty line of $32 than to the basic rural 
poverty line (to say nothing of the urban poverty line). While Del Monte’s Costa Rican 
pineapple division president says his company pays about 40 percent above the minimum 
wage on average, human rights activists counter by pointing out that interviews with 
hundreds of field workers, indicated that they are paid only minimum wage without 
compensation for overtime (Goodier, 2005b: 20). In all likelihood, there are probably a 
few people in management positions who receive a handsome salary, thereby skewing the 
average pay away from the median pay.  
                                                
 
42
 Bananas are the number one exported crop.  
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Nevertheless, Guillermo Acuña from the Services Association of Labor 
Promotion (ASEPROLA) explains that those who speak positively of the pineapple 
industry point out that it brings jobs to poor rural areas and they view the activity as a 
way for families to meet their most basic needs (Acuña, 2005: 54). On the other hand, he 
points out throughout his report that the chemicals the workers are exposed to can cause 
acute cases of asthma, allergies and sickness that help offset the net contribution basic 
wages contribute to meeting basic health needs. The destruction of clean aquifers by large 
pineapple corporations also goes against the net health benefits of many communities.
43
 
Meanwhile, the long workday (people work long hours to make extra money) destroys 
family and community solidarity. In the end, he explains that the government does not 
have plans to address these issues because as one national governmental representative 
explained to him, “nothing can be done because it is an activity that gives work to people. 
(54).” However, one has to wonder if, before the transnational corporations bought up 
large tracts of land, rural farmers were better off from subsistence living on the land. 
Clearly, the present situation with the growing pineapple industry is not a viable way to 
create healthy communities free of poverty. While other plantation workers who help 
cultivate such exports as banana do not face quite as bad of conditions, the prospects for 
most of these workers are still grim as well.      
Ultimately, while the dynamic external sector of the economy has grown 
tremendously, providing the well-educated with rather well-paying English language 
based and high-technology jobs through such companies as Intel (obviously the entire 
middle class is not disappearing), those traditionally living in poverty do not benefit 
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 Deforestation and eventual exhaustive use of the land are other environmental consequences that may 
hinder sustainable development and poverty alleviation in the long run.  
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(Kimitch, 2004: 5-6). Furthermore, if foreign firms do provide employment for the poor, 
it generally does not help them out of poverty. One of the newest corporations to enter 
the Costa Rican market is Wal-Mart, which in March of 2006 became the owner of most 
of the country’s supermarkets. While Wal-Mart is expected to create thousands of jobs in 
Costa Rica as well as the rest of Central America, labor conditions under Wal-Mart have 
been criticized in the United States and other countries and leave doubt as to the end 
result in Costa Rica. Aquileo Sánchez of Wal-Mart’s International Corporate Affairs 
division boasts that Wal-Mart’s presence in Costa Rica will increase the number of Costa 
Rican products on the shelves of North American stores. In fact, he cites as an example 
that the company recently signed an agreement to sell Costa Rican pineapple in Wal-Mart 
stores in the U.S. and Canada. The goal is to have 10 percent of all pineapple sold in 
these stores to come from Costa Rica (Stanley, 2006b: 1, 19-20). Consequently, this is a 
recipe for ignorant U.S. and Canadian consumers to support a culture of poverty in Costa 
Rica. 
 
In Search for Better Answers  
 In the end, neoliberal theory has proven disappointing. As this chapter has 
shown, the increasing economic wealth generated through its practices seldom if ever 
reaches the pockets of the poor. If prices for consumption have lowered, and 
modernization has progressed, it has by no means offset poverty. While Costa Rica 
should take advantage of exporting to an international market, it must do so in a way that 
is better linked to the wellbeing of all its residents. The same is true for the growing 
service industry inside the country, particularly tourism. Finding such links is the topic of 
the next chapter.  
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V. Creating Quality Employment: Connecting the Missing Links and Building an 
Alternative Vision 
 
In recent years, Costa Rica’s economy has grown considerably as a whole as 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) and exports. Perhaps the largest benefit to 
national welfare from this growth has been the creation of new jobs. According to the 
Proyecto Estado de la Nación report, between 1990 and 2003, Costa Rica generated 
570,190 new jobs (2004: 164). While the report indicated a slight general increase in the 
percentage of employment among the working age population between 1994 and 2003 
from 53.1 percent to 55.5 percent,
44
 there has nevertheless been an increase in open 
unemployment
45
 during that same period from 4.2 percent to 6.7 percent (400). 
Underemployment also increased during that time. Of all the age groups, those hurt most 
by unemployment have been the 12-24 age group. Further, among this sector of the 
population, those with lower levels of education (namely the poor) have been most 
affected by this problem (165).  
As a solution, some policy makers might suggest lowering the minimum wage in 
order to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) to be able to employ more of the 
poor. While such an approach could potentially slightly reduce poverty, particularly 
extreme poverty, the evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that in terms of 
the overall wellbeing of society, the drawbacks outweigh the benefits. Indeed, such a 
policy would not prove to be a beneficial poverty reduction strategy in the long run 
because international competition for cheap labor would exploit the poor and vulnerable.  
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 The larger workforce in proportion to the size of the working age population means more people in the 
household are working which should theoretically raise household income. However, not enough 
information is available to determine which households this most affects.    
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 Open unemployment is the fraction of those unemployed as a percentage of the total labor force 
population (not as a percentage of the total working age population).   
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In this chapter, I examine many of the malaises plaguing each sector of the 
economy and conclude that opening up the economy indiscriminately to FDI has not and 
will not reduce poverty in Costa Rica. Rather, I argue that poverty, as a concept 
influenced by environmental, cultural and political factors, must be addressed by the very 
people it affects with the assistance of the government and other actors such as non-
profits, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and international organizations in order 
for it to be reduced. In the end, a more prosperous and egalitarian society will come from 
a more empowered and educated lower class.     
 
Recent Changes in the Make-Up and Importance of Economic Activities: An 
Overview of Problems and Solutions  
 
The Primary Economy 
 
During the last several years, Costa Rica has seen major shifts and changes among 
its primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy.
46
 The first of these, the 
primary industrial sector, is the part of the economy that specializes in agricultural 
products and the extraction of raw materials. The major industry here is agriculture, 
although the sector is also composed of mining, forestry, and fishing. Between 1990 and 
2003, the percentage of the economically active population employed in this sector of the 
economy dropped from 25 percent to 14.8 percent. The absolute number of employed 
dropped as well. Meanwhile, between 1991 and 2003, the primary sector fell much less 
significantly in terms of relative GDP from 13.2 percent to 10.9 percent of the total GDP 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 162). This primarily reflects a loss of small and 
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 These three sectors represent about 99 percent of the Costa Rican economy. The other 1% is classified as 
“other.” (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 162)  
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medium scale farming and its limited replacement by more efficient, mechanized and 
lucrative larger scale farming (for the owners and managers, not the workers).  
Currently, there is questionable potential for overall growth in this sector of the 
economy. While non-traditional crops such as pineapple appear to be doing quite well, 
traditional crops such as coffee and bananas appear to be shrinking in market size due to 
falling agricultural prices. This sector is not only threatened in terms of export output and 
prices, but also in terms of its domestic market due to cheaper imports from reduced 
tariffs. If Costa Rica ratifies a pending free trade agreement with the United States,
47
 
these imports will become even cheaper; however, such an agreement, while hurting 
producers for the local market, has the potential to increase profits for some exporters due 
to gradual increases in their allowable quota of crop shipments to the United States.  
Ideally, however, the government should reduce the speed at which it decreases 
protection for threatened small and medium scale farmers as part of a larger effort to 
better integrate these farmers into other sectors of the economy. This should be a priority 
even if it comes at the cost of increased exports for some farmers because the farmers 
who have the most to lose (from their current state) should be attended to first. While 
such a priority may cause the country to lose in overall profits, it is nevertheless more 
conducive to reducing both poverty and inequality. At the same time, the government 
should continue to focus attention on integrating the other remaining small and medium 
scale farmers into the role of producers for the larger companies. Up until this point, it 
appears the government has been relatively successful at this (Antillón et al., 2005: 35). 
Nevertheless, the government has made huge budgetary cuts to the Ministries of 
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 This Pending Agreement, DR-CAFTA, is talked about at greater length in chapter five.   
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Agriculture and Livestock and other institutions related to agriculture in recent years 
thereby putting the future of many farmers in peril, while continuing to ignore the 
hardships faced by many others over the last couple of decades. Difficult access to credit 
is another problem. One of the reasons for difficult access to credit may have to do with a 
1995 law that allowed private banks to compete with public banks. While public banks 
responded to the competition with modernization and increased effectiveness, the 
survival of the public banks rested upon eliminating their ability to provide affordable 
credit to micro and small businesses (Seligson, 2005: 9-10).  
 Another way the government may be able to help, is by putting a greater 
emphasis on tapping the growing demand for organic farming in general. This would 
allow for a more sustainable use of the land, thereby better retaining important natural 
resources for future generations. In turn, retaining natural resources is an essential 
element to any long-term poverty reduction strategy because retaining the land’s natural 
ability to create or grow domestic raw materials allows for greater levels of value added
48
 
(in terms of the final product for consumption) within the country, creating the potential 
for more quality employment,
49
 especially in more skill-intensive industries as explained 
a little later on in this chapter.
50
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 Value added is the amount of a product’s final value added at each stage of production. This value 
increases inside a country as import levels of inputs decrease, everything else held constant.    
 
49
 Greater levels of domestic value added do not necessarily mean more quality employment. The 
businesses in which the value is added must be able to compete in their respective markets. Just because a 
natural resource exists, does not mean it ought to be actively utilized (even in a sustainable manner) if it 
cannot compete in the domestic or world markets. However, such a resource may become of active 
economical use later on. Furthermore, a natural resource generally helps support, directly of indirectly the 
preservation of other economically viable resources. In general then, resource conservation is a good way 
to combat poverty in the long-run.   
 
50
 In other words, there are industries besides farming that use natural resources. For example, the 
manufacturing industry can use plants to make medicine.   
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The Secondary Economy 
 
Another major area of the economy is the secondary industrial sector which deals 
exclusively with manufacturing intermediate producer goods from raw materials and final 
products from either the raw goods or the intermediate goods. Between 1991 and 2003, 
the sector’s share of the country’s total GDP increased from 22.4 percent to 23.8 percent 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004:162). This change reflects an increase in output 
(particularly exports) due to an increase in the number of transnational corporations in 
Free Zones (FZs). Indeed, according to Paus, total manufacturing output was 29 percent 
higher in 2003 than in 1997, reflecting both a 200 percent increase in FZ production and 
a 4.6 percent decrease in non-FZ production.
51
 As a reflection of this, during this same 
period, overall employment in the sector stagnated—increasing in the FZ sector while 
declining in the non-FZ sector (2005: 153).
52
  
The non-FZ stagnation of the manufacturing sector and its correlating decline in 
employment appear to be due in part to the rising competitive pressures that have come 
with tariff liberalization. In essence, the influx of cheaper imports undermines the ability 
for non-FZ manufacturing enterprises (most of which are nationally owned) to compete. 
Difficult access to finance capital is another factor that has affected growth negatively. 
One of the reasons for difficult access to credit may have to do with opening up the 
public banking sector to private competition as explained in the previous section. The net 
out-transfer of development funds during most of the 1990s did not help either (Paus, 
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 Non FZ production is a fairly good indication of the production of domestic businesses (run by Costa 
Rican residents).   
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 As of 2003, 14.5 percent of the population was employed in manufacturing (Proyecto Estado de la 
Nación, 2004:162).   
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2005: 136). Finally, a lack of government support in the transition from a protected 
market to a market with international prices and competition has also contributed to this 
stagnation in the non-FZ manufacturing sector. Indeed, over the last twenty years, there 
has been a weakening in the institutional support and promotion of traditional productive 
activities in not only agriculture, but also manufacturing as the money allotted to these 
areas has decreased (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 168). Just as disturbing 
however, is the downsizing of The Ministry of National Planning and Political Economy 
(MIDEPLAN), one of the key institutions charged with national development planning 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 58). Indeed, the lack of a cohesive network of 
proactive government institutions to implement any sort of comprehensive development 
strategy puts the future of the country at risk (Paus, 2005: 136).   
Simply opening up the economy to FDI in manufacturing without an active 
government role in development, will lead to undesirable outcomes, including increases 
in poverty. Although as of the late 1990s FZ
53
 wages were 25 percent higher than non-FZ 
wages in manufacturing (Paus, 2005: 149), creating a secondary economy based mostly 
or entirely on employment by foreign companies would require a much more educated 
work force (and therefore more technologically advanced employment) if Costa Rica 
wanted to potentially significantly reduce national poverty in that way.
54
 However, even 
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 Between 1986 and 2000 about 35,000 jobs or 2.5 percent of the total labor force in Costa Rica was 
dedicated to employment in the FZs (Antillón et al., 2005: 33).  
 
54
 Some may argue that the knowledge gained from increasingly high-tech employment by transnational 
corporations would spill over into the rest of the manufacturing industry, and create Costa Rican-run 
industries that could compete with the foreign companies. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in China. 
However, Costa Rica does not yet have a strong enough base of human capital or infrastructure to 
successfully carry this out. Perhaps just as importantly though, the country does not have the bargaining 
power that China had to do this. As Todaro and Smith explain, “Government played off potential investors 
who wanted access to China’s billion-plus consumers, demanding and getting extensive technology 
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with a more educated workforce in place, such a strategy would leave the country 
vulnerable to capital flight due to relative changes in the demand of goods and the price 
of labor on the world market.
55
 Furthermore, in light of the precarious world market and 
the control they would have over employment,
56
 transnational corporations (TNCs) could 
potentially use blackmail to lower the minimum wage, or to receive other benefits not in 
the interest of the Costa Rican people, thereby reducing the power of the nation’s people 
to create their own democratic change. This in turn would likely cause demoralization, 
increased crime, popular unrest and further risk of capital flight (as well as hurting the 
booming tourism industry). In essence then, a long-term poverty reduction strategy must 
keep in mind the need for a sense of national belonging and power among all its residents 
(i.e. democracy) as well as the vulnerabilities of the world market.   
Given the need for democracy then, the country should take advantage of the 
relative importance of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).
57
 According to one 
recent article in the Univeristy of Costa Rica’s newspaper, Semanario Universidad, 51 
percent of the jobs in the private sector are supplied by enterprises with less than 20 
employees (Flórez-Estrada, 2005). In the manufacturing sector in particular, SMEs 
represent 80 percent of total jobs. This highlights the importance of smaller sized 
enterprises in terms of employment. (Organization of American States, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                            
transfers, public and private Chinese business partnerships, local content and other concessions in exchange 
for the right to sell to Chinese citizens” (2005: 176).  
 
55
 Costa Rica provides a prime example of the volatile nature of the world market. The $2.56 billion earned 
in the high-tech electronics industry in 1999, dropped to a mere $913 million in 2001 before finally picking 
up again to earn $1.41 billion in 2003 (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 163).     
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 In a small country such as Costa Rica, each TNC would have more power over the government than in a 
larger country.   
 
57
 According to the Social Security Institute of Costa Rica (CCSS), micro-enterprises (micro-businesses) 
operate with 1-9 people, small sized enterprises (businesses) operate with 10-19 people and medium sized 
businesses have 20-99 employees.     
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Unfortunately, according to a 2002 Social Watch report, less than 17 percent of nationally 
owned SMEs
58
 (and none of the country’s micro-enterprises) produce directly for export 
(Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 2002: 103). This low percentage likely reflects the primary 
sector just as much as it reflects the manufacturing sector given the similar sizes of each 
economic sector respectively (in addition to taking into account their relative hardships). 
 Given then, the unpleasant position faced by the national manufacturing sector in 
terms of unfavorable competition in the domestic market, difficult access to the 
international market, and relatively low wages, the government must execute a plan to 
increase the quality of employment for the population at large in this sector of the 
economy in order to help reduce poverty.         
 
A High-tech Approach to Reducing Poverty  
Despite its current struggling situation, one of the most promising areas for 
improving employment opportunities for Costa Rica in the long run is in the 
manufacturing industry. In recent years, Costa Rica has taken a high-tech approach to 
manufacturing by attracting FDI in this area. In fact, between 1997 and 2003, about one 
third of manufacturing FDI was in the electronics sector, most notably Intel’s $300 
million investment (Paus, 2005: 143). While only a limited part of the Costa Rican 
population can benefit from this sort of high-tech investment because of the sophisticated 
skill sets that it involves, in theory, there should be positive knowledge spillovers into the 
rest of the economy through a sort of trickle down effect. Paus highlights three ways this 
is possible.  
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 It should be noted that almost all SMEs (if not all of them) are domestically owned.  
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First, TNCs may help local input producers
59
 upgrade their technological 
capabilities directly through technology acquisition or knowledge sharing (2005: 26). 
However, it is logical that a TNC would do that only if such producers were already 
competitive with producers in other countries. This is generally not the case in Costa 
Rica. Indeed, foreign companies under the special exportation regimes
60
 bought only an 
average of 3.2 percent of their inputs domestically from 2000 to 2003. Even more 
shocking is that this was a .2 percent drop from the 1998-1999 two-year average 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 160). Furthermore, this missing link between the 
local business and foreign companies limits the market to which local businesses can sell, 
helping reduce the profitability of the local manufacturing sector. Considering local 
businesses have to pay taxes and TNCs generally do not,
61
 this lack of forward linkage 
capabilities on the part of the local manufacturing sector signifies a corresponding lack of 
potential government tax revenue.   
The second way in which knowledge may spill over into the rest of the economy 
is through the human capital effect, where employees of high-tech TNCs use the 
knowledge they gain from these corporations and apply them when they move to a 
domestic company or establish their own business. The final way in which knowledge 
may be transferred is through the demonstration effect, as domestic producers are 
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 Input producers make and sell the supplies (components) necessary for the next stage in the 
manufacturing process.   
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 The special exportation regimes include both FZs and Active Processing Regimes. The latter allows 
duty-free import of inputs used in the production of exports (Paus, 2005: 140).  
 
61
 The tax exemptions within FZs are allowed in Costa Rica and throughout the world by those countries 
that belong to the World Trade Organization. The WTO will eliminate these allowable exemptions in 2007 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 159). However, not too many countries are likely to raise taxes very 
significantly for TNCs in fear that these corporations will simply move to another part of the world if they 
are already in the country, or will choose another more profitable country in which to locate instead if they 
have not yet chosen to invest in the country.     
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exposed to the TNC’s products, marketing strategies and different production processes.
62
 
However, these last two methods of knowledge spillover do not seem to have worked 
very well so far given the preliminary evidence of a stagnating manufacturing sector as 
previously mentioned.  
Unfortunately, if the country cannot rely heavily on TNCs inside the country for 
necessary technological know-how to strengthen national companies, trying to obtain that 
knowledge from other countries is even harder. In fact, the World Bank asserts that “even 
basic research does not flow easily or costlessly across borders so developing countries 
cannot simply rely on what is being generated in the advanced countries” (Country 
Innovation Brief: 1). Perhaps then, Costa Rica should put more money into research and 
development (R&D) in areas in which it has potential such as chemistry, plastics or 
software. The amount of money spent on R&D as a percentage of GDP during the 1990s 
(0.23 percent)
63
 was below the average for countries that have had similar levels of GDP, 
similar size labor force, and similar value of merchandise exports to the United States 
since the 1960s (World Bank, Country Innovation Brief: 3-4). This is perhaps one of the 
many reasons countries such as Finland, Korea or Israel have been more successful in 
their technological advancements and their Human Development Index rankings
64
 in 
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 In each of these cases, the knowledge may be in the form of process know-how, generalized management 
know-how, or, probably the least transferable, product design know-how (Paus, 2005: 26). 
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 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lists Costa Rica’s R&D expenditure to be at 0.4 
percent of GDP. If the World Bank and the UNDP used the same type of calculations for these 
measurements, then Costa Rica has begun to increase its expenditure on R&D considerably.    
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 “The human development index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a 
country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life 
expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment 
ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars” (United Nations Development Programme, 2005: 
214).   
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general (United Nations Development Programme, 2005: 262). Given that average 
returns to R&D are higher in less developed countries, Costa Rica may very well benefit 
from putting more into research and development. The World Bank in particular suggests 
the state should invest between two and eight times more in R&D than it did in the 1990s 
(World Bank, Country Innovation Brief: 4).
65
  
The question then becomes how to do this strategically. One solution would be to 
better link the knowledge generated in the country’s universities with the manufacturing 
industry. According to Láscaris, the greatest scientific-technological capacity in Costa 
Rica is in the public sector, particularly the state universities. She further states that about 
45 percent of national manufacturers have sought and received help through state 
universities. These include principally small businesses in the areas of food, beverage and 
tobacco and medium and large businesses in the areas of chemicals, rubber and plastics. 
However, only a third of exporting manufacturing businesses have come to universities in 
search of advice (Láscaris, 2004: 79-80). In light of this, the government should help 
facilitate a stronger link between universities and the manufacturing industry. In order for 
this to take place, there must be a long-term plan that spans multiple governments 
through some sort of decree or law.  
The ultimate goal of the domestic manufacturing industry should be to become a 
stable competitor on the world (and to a lesser extent, domestic) market. If Costa Rica 
wants to create domestic companies that can afford to pay employees well in a sector that 
is resistant to price swings and market saturation, then an emphasis should be put on a 
long-term goal of exporting as diverse an array of goods as is possible (given 
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 See also, for example, Láscaris, 2004: 64-67.   
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international competition), especially in the area of high-tech, medium-tech and 
innovative goods. In particular, areas such as biotechnology, plastics and software are a 
good place to start because of the promise these industries already show in development 
and their (in some cases) potential to forward-link to high-tech TNCs that include Intel 
and makers of medical supplies.  
In terms of exporting their goods, domestic companies have two options: indirect 
internationalization (selling to foreign corporations inside the country) or direct 
internationalization (selling to corporations outside the country) (Láscaris, 2004:129-30). 
I believe exportation should be done primarily through indirect internationalization (at 
least in the short and medium terms) because of the competitive advantages TNCs have 
in exporting; however, direct internationalization should be considered for those 
enterprises that find it profitable. Furthermore, all companies should attempt to obtain 
their inputs through local suppliers, thereby keeping money inside the country, and 
supporting further employment. All of this will require a more efficient and coordinated 
government and a more educated population. A more accessible and higher quality 
university education with greater emphasis on science, technology and business 
administration may help in this regard. In order for a larger segment of the population to 
have the opportunity to benefit from a university education, more students must graduate 
from high school. Social spending on public education and educational scholarships 
through the high school level is important in terms of a development plan that is 
economically beneficial for all sectors of society, in particular the poor.  
Indeed, the quality of instruction as well as graduation rates in primary and 
secondary education are vital concerns in terms of developing a competent workforce. 
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Between 1990 and 2002, the graduation rate from primary school (for those starting 
school at the same time) increased from 76.7 percent, to 84.1 percent.
66
 However, the 
high school graduation rate made only a slight general increase during the same time 
period from 39.9 percent to 42.0 percent
67
 (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 86). The 
lack of confidence the public has in the quality of secondary education in public schools 
(versus private schools) is one reason that while 93.8 percent of students attended public 
secondary schools in 1980, only 88.0 percent did so 2004 (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 
2005: 90). Unfortunately, only the middle and upper classes can afford the better 
education of private universities thereby encouraging future income inequality.
68
 This 
highlights the need to put more money into public education, which in turn requires a 
stronger government with more money to spend.
69
  
In the end, a stronger, more high-tech national manufacturing sector has the 
potential to lead to higher quality employment for more people. It would also allow for 
greater tax collection from the manufacturing industry (especially considering TNCs will 
not stay in the country if tax rates are too high
70
) which could in turn be used for more 
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 These statistic includes those who repeated various grades up to a maximum of three times. The 
graduation rate of students who never had to repeat a grade during their primary education (six years of 
education) increased from 44.6 percent in 1990 to 53.7 percent in 2003.    
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 As is the case for primary education, these statistic includes those who repeated various grades up to a 
maximum of three times. The graduation rate of students who never had to repeat a grade during their 
secondary education increased 22.7 percent in 1990 to 25.3 percent in 2003.   
 
68
 In addition, in Costa Rica, like anywhere else, not all public schools have the same quality education. 
Public schools in poorer areas are more likely to be of a lower quality.    
 
69
 I write about the financial situation of the government later in this section.    
 
70
 This is true even when the WTO will end its rule (starting 2007) on allowing tax exemptions on income 
profit for companies in FZs. This is because countries can adopt other preferential tax-related policies that 
do not violate WTO regulations thereby allowing for an unhealthy “race to the bottom” in terms of tax 
incentives in developing countries (Paus, 2005: 204-05). As a result, TNCs will continue to become richer 
without sharing very significant portions of their large profits within the countries they operate.    
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social spending on the poor and population at large. However, the manufacturing industry 
in Costa Rica faces some serious obstacles to development. For one thing, the 
international market can be potentially volatile in terms of prices, even for a wide range 
of goods. Second, many of the opportunities in the high-tech market will continue to be 
taken by other countries. In particular, TNCs will continue to relocate a large share of 
their high-tech production to lower-wage Asian countries that contain large numbers of 
skilled and unskilled labor. The key then is for Costa Rica to find niche markets where 
production is not so sensitive to economies of scale,
71
 and where original ideas can be 
protected through intellectual property rights (Paus, 2005: 204). However, Costa Rica’s 
successes in these fields are limited by the extent to which the country can improve its 
level of human capital (education) in science, technology and business administration, by 
the extent to which it can improve its infrastructure (especially roads), and ultimately by 
its ability to coordinate a development plan that can successfully rival other competing 
countries.  
The Tertiary Economy 
 
Despite the potential of the manufacturing sector of the economy, it is not an 
appropriate place for Costa Rica to hinge most of its bets for the future elimination of 
poverty and development in the country. Instead, it should be seen as one pillar of a 
grander scheme that caters to the needs and lifestyles of as many Costa Ricans as 
possible. The other major area of the economy that shows future promise is the tertiary 
industrial sector, also known as the services and commerce portion of the economy. In 
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 As defined by Todaro and Smith, economies of scale is economies of growth resulting from expansion of 
the scale of productive capacity of a firm or industry, leading to increases in its output and decreases in its 
cost of production per unit of output (2005: 811).  
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 financial activities, wholesale and retail commerce, and construction
74
. This 
sector of the economy jumped from employing 56.1 percent of the population in 1990 to 
employing 70.2 percent of the population in 2003. Meanwhile, its percentage in terms of 
total GDP increased slightly from 64.1 percent in 1991 to 65.2 percent in 2003 (Proyecto 
Estado de la Nación, 2004:162).  
The growth of this industry is due in large part to an increase in tourism, 
particularly ecotourism. Between 1990 and 2003, the number of tourists entering the 
country increased almost three fold from 435,000 to 1,239,000 per year. Meanwhile, the 
income from tourism during this same period increased from US $275 million to US $1.2 
billion (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 412). While only 40 percent of all money 
spent by tourists stays in Costa Rica, this is still almost four times higher than the 
corresponding percentage for other prime tourist locations in the Caribbean and Mexico 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004:162). Nevertheless, this percentage could be higher 
and its allocation among the local economy could be more evenly distributed if the 
government supported a community-based development that empowered the local 
population more than TNCs and larger businesses, especially since Costa Rica is now 
known worldwide as a prime tourist destination. While big businesses do attract tourists, 
they also tend to threaten the long-term sustainability of the industry through 
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 These are service jobs that deal with electricity, gas, water, transportation, storage and communications.  
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 Construction is often considered part of the secondary industrial sector, but in Costa Rica, it is considered 
tertiary.   
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environmental exploitation and by turning unique aspects of tourism into a generic 
offering that can be found the world over (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 202).  
The best type of tourism for Costa Rica is sustainable tourism, particularly 
ecotourism. People come to Costa Rica to enjoy not only the natural beauty and wildlife 
of the country, but also the local flavor of the communities. However, natural resources, 
as a foundation for this tourism, must be maintained by the communities that are nearest 
to them, with strong regulatory oversight by the government, so that the country can 
enjoy the income from this unique activity long into the future.  If local communities do 
not have a say in the development process of tourism and if the government cannot 
sufficiently regulate the development process, then tourism will cease to be a long-term 
form of poverty alleviation. Although the Costa Rican tourism boom is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the government must make critical decisions early on involving the 
environment. For example, in the dry northwest region of Guanacaste, where water 
shortages are starting to become more severe, the government, with input from the 
communities affected, must decide which and how much water goes to rapidly expanding 
beach resorts, and how much will be allotted to local communities, huge cattle ranches 
and rice farms (Schott, 2005: 6).  
However, the government does not always work on behalf of its people. Take, for 
example, the case of the luxury resort Villas del Caribe in the southern Caribbean coastal 
town of Puerto Viejo built in the early 1990s by the Canadian corporation Desarrollos 
Ecológicos (Ecological Developments). This resort advertises a place to sleep and 
relaxation on the beach in addition to such activities as horseback riding, snorkeling and a 
250-acre private reserve where tourists can soak in nature. What the resort advertisers fail 
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to communicate to potential tourists however, is that it illegally occupies both part of a 
government-owned wildlife refuge and part of the Kéböldi Indian Reserve. Although the 
company offered $5,000 to a local native organization, it did not consult indigenous 
leaders or offer to pay them some form of rent or share of the resort’s profits. While the 
Costa Rican government never authorized this takeover, it did not step in to defend the 
rights of the indigenous population either, which has lost its land without any significant 
compensation (Kardos, 2005: 6).
75
 The government’s laissez faire (deregulated) approach 
to planning, control and zoning in general have led to many “exceptions to the rule.” The 
construction of both locally and foreign owned hotels and restaurants are often completed 
in some of the most pristine locations with little regard for their impact on the 
environment and the local people (Van Der Duim et. al, 2002: 163) and with little or no 
government initiated consequence.          
Concentrating in particular on the financial end of community-centered tourism 
development, it is discouraging to find failures in the integration of local economies into 
tourism, despite local entrepreneurs’ strongly demonstrated interest in providing services 
to growing numbers of tourists. This has happened in such places as Tortuguero, where 
the pace of outside investment has not allowed the villagers time to accumulate their own 
capital to invest in tourist facilities and services. In this case, the government ignored the 
efforts of local entrepreneurs and instead focused limited resources on foreign investors 
(Buchsbaum, 2004: 28). If the ecotourism industry is to develop in a sustainable manner, 
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 Multimillionaire Maurice Strong, the owner of Desarrollos Ecológicos, organized the 1992 UN Earth 
Summit in Brazil. The Summit, a conference on environmental development, resulted in the creation of 
Agenda 21—a set of guidelines for corporate responsibility and sustainable development. However, the 
guidelines revolve around neoliberal ideologies such as lifting trade restrictions and deregulating the 
tourism industry, while stressing stronger self-regulation. One of the consequences of this form of 
development, as embodied by the actions of Strong himself, is alienation of the local community from the 
profits of sustainable development, if indeed the development is truly sustainable.     
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the government must become more active in finding additional ways to provide poor 
local people with micro-credit financing and training skills. The government could also 
be more proactive in providing subsidies, duty exemptions and other incentives 
(Buchsbaum, 2004: 36).   
Another problem with mass tourism development is that it raises the cost of living 
in the areas it takes over. One study of the Osa peninsula demonstrated how ecotourism 
actually made local residents poorer (Buchsbaum, 2004: 28). If tourism is going to make 
communities richer then, the local community must have control over the pace of 
development, while at the same time receive the necessary education to take on the jobs 
necessary for carrying out that development. Successful community-based sustainable 
ecotourism involves more than just minimum wage room cleaners. It often involves 
people who speak English, know about the natural world around them, know and 
participate in the local culture, know how to design arts and crafts, know how to run 
small service-based businesses such as high adventure repelling and know how to run 
successful advertising campaigns. It also involves creative construction workers, talented 
chefs and people who genuinely care for the wellbeing of the community, the 
environment and the tourists.  
While tourism is in many ways harming communities in some areas, in others it is 
allowing people sufficient income to maintain their identity, culture and live comfortably. 
Rural community-based tourism
76
 is a relatively new and growing type of tourism in 
Costa Rica which organizers and community leaders see as perhaps the most sustainable 
and equitable type of tourism yet. It is made up of local cooperatives and organizations 
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 More information on community-based rural development in Costa Rica can be found at 
www.actuarcostarica.com.  
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that lead tours that focus on the people (farmers, fishermen and indigenous populations), 
the land and the traditional culture of the particular areas involved. In this way, various 
groups of people such as small organic farmers have enough supplemental income so that 
they do not have to leave their primary activities. At the same time, if tourism were to 
slow or stop because of a war or crisis, these people would still have their original 
primary activity. The lead actor behind this new movement is the Costa Rican 
Association for Rural Community Tourism (ACTUAR), an NGO that came into 
existence in 2001 as a way to help publicize and market the country’s growing rural 
community tourism projects, many of which the United Nations Development Program 
(UNPD) helped finance (Baxter-Neal, 2005: 1, 6-7).  
This grassroots organization transcends many ill thought-out development 
theories, perhaps the most dangerous of which is the idea that the economic benefits of 
mass ecotourism trickles down to communities on its own. As we have seen, this is not 
the case. Simply transferring resources to compensate groups for their poverty does not 
work well either, because it only provides temporary relief and can destroy the fabric of 
communities. Rather, ACTUAR understands that an integrated set of productive projects 
that offer rural communities and families the opportunity to generate goods and services, 
will contribute to raising their living standards while simultaneously improving or 
maintaining the environment in which they live (Asociación Costarricense de Turismo 
Rural Comunitario; Barkin, David, 2001: 202). This is not only true for tourism related 
development, but for all sectors of the economy, at least to some extent. I believe it also 
has the potential to be applied to poor neighborhoods and shantytowns within cities and 
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suburbs as well, although this would likely involve the need for the greatest government 
and NGO infusion of resources.  
Within this whole framework of thinking, it is always necessary to keep in mind 
the importance of integrating the community into the decision making process in order to 
combine potential social, cultural and economic competencies. With the participation of 
the entire or even the majority of the community, individuals can better understand and 
resist future economic exploitation. However, to be truly able to avoid exploitation, 
communities must be integrated into the political power structure of the country thereby 
influencing more sweeping national policies (Barkin, 2001: 194). In this sense, greater 
democratic participation among the marginalized of Costa Rican society could bring 
about more equitable development schemes that in turn would be able to reduce poverty 
(Barkin, 2001: 197) and allow for more strategic links with the international economy.  
 
The Need for a Stronger Government 
  
In order for the government to be an effective catalyst for change in national 
development, it must have sufficient money. Unfortunately, from 1993 to 2003 old and 
new public expenditures reflect a growing public debt (primarily internal debt) in terms 
of dollars, while in relative terms, this debt remains at about 60 percent of GDP (Proyecto 
Estado de la Nación, 2004: 198). However, the debt to GDP ratio is not a good indication 
in and of itself, at least not in Costa Rica, of whether debt growth is under control. This is 
because the growth in GDP primarily reflects a growth in exports, especially among 
TNCs, and among income generated from tourist expenditures. It does not necessarily 
have a strong causal correlation with government income, which is generated primarily 
through taxes. Fortunately, however, between 1991 and 2003, income from taxes 
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increased from 11 percent to 13 percent of GDP
77
 (not including social security). 
However, while it now appears evident that the growing debt can be and has been 
managed in the short term, the question now at hand becomes at what cost.  
In order to answer this, we must know what percent of government expenditures 
has been used to service the debt. This is where things get ugly. Indeed, the amount spent 
per year by the General Government
78
 on servicing the total public debt increased from 
about 28 percent expenditures in 1990 to about half of expenditures in 2003 as the 
interest rates on the debt grew (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004: 198). Still, under 
these circumstances, the government was able to increase social spending during the 
1990s, while cutting back its institutional spending in areas such as agriculture. 
Nevertheless, the welfare state has started to burst at the seams. During 2003 and 2004, 
some of the money that the government would normally have used for social spending 
went instead to service an increasing debt. As a result, social spending decreased during 
these years as a whole. One notable exception, however, is education. Social spending in 
education increased from 3.8 percent of GDP in 1990 to 5.9 percent of GDP in 2003 
(Seligson, 2005: 13). Nevertheless, the government could still use more money for 
education in order to make it completely free for the poor, and to improve the quality to 
be on par with private education at the elementary and high school levels. 
Unfortunately, the booming export economy is not able to contribute much to 
taxes (and has actually decreased as a percentage of total taxes) because of the tax 
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 See footnote 77 for an explanation of what constitutes the General Government.  
 61
exemptions stipulated under the FZ incentives. Meanwhile, income and sales taxes 
continue to remain low. Ironically, Costa Rica, one of the most developed states in Latin 
America, simultaneously remains among one of the most poorly funded (Seligson, 2005: 
13). Indeed, the liberalization of the economy has not been able to replace the role of a 
strong government in terms of economic and social development.  
In order to generate more money for purposes such as infrastructure development, 
social spending, and business development, the government must ultimately revamp its 
tax plan. The Permanent Fiscal Reform Package, first introduced to the Legislature at the 
beginning of Abel Pacheco’s term as president in 2002, aims to do just that. While the 
current tax system is territorial, meaning that people and corporations are taxed only on 
income earned inside the country, the proposed worldwide system would tax all foreign 
earned income as well. Just as importantly though, it would make tax evasion much 
harder, given that under the current law people and businesses can (and do) claim that 
unexplained and untaxed sums of money, properties and other assets came from abroad. 
The plan would also lower income taxes for anyone making under $3,000 a month while 
raising taxes for everyone who earns more than that amount. The tax rate for corporations 
meanwhile would be a flat 30 percent. This would include TNCs in FZs once their 
income tax exemptions expire in 2007. Finally, the plan calls for an expansion of the 13 
percent sales tax to include all goods and services (not just a handful) except for certain 
services the government deems vital such as limited quotas of water and electricity. In 
addition to all this, a National Tax Administration would be created to oversee and help 
create a more efficient and transparent tax collection process (Baxter-Neal, 2005c: 14-
15).  
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The only part of the plan that appears to work against poverty alleviation is the 
sales tax, which would make basic goods more expensive for the poor. Nevertheless, the 
legislation, if it were to pass would likely do the poor more good than harm. 
Unfortunately, Pacheco, who spent his whole term advocating the Permanent Fiscal 
Reform Package as an important means of poverty alleviation, finished his term in May 
of 2006 without seeing it pass due primarily to the resistance of the right-winged 
Libertarian Movement party. According to Pacheco, his greatest failure as president was 
not getting the tax plan approved (Kimitch and Stanley, 2006: 2).  
Unfortunately, the type of opposition faced by the tax plan has become a 
relatively common phenomenon in recent years due at least in part to unstable political 
parties resulting in not only strong disagreements between parties, but also strong 
disagreements within parties. Over the last twenty years, Costa Rica’s historically most 
powerful political party, the National Liberation Party (PLN) shared power with the 
Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC). However, during this time, the PLN left its social 
democratic roots, particularly the concept of fighting for greater social equality, and 
leaned increasingly toward neoliberal reforms. As a result, many legislators who left the 
party created or joined other parties to the political left (Lubliner, 2005:10). After the 
2006 elections, the PLN replaced PUSC as the dominant right-of-center political party 
and the Citizen Action Party (PAC) took up the PLN’s old left-of-center position in the 
political spectrum. However, it remains to be seen whether this will result in more stable 
political ideologies (among individual parties) that in turn lead to a more efficient 
legislative assembly.
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 Another problem that needs to be resolved, is a more efficient way of passing bills without excessively 
long filibustering.  
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Despite all its financial and political difficulties though, the government has still 
made some efforts in the right direction, particularly in the area of education. For 
example, the state-funded National Training Institute (INA) has grown tremendously 
over the last few years. Since May 2002, it has served about 28 percent of its total 
students (640,000, or the equivalent of over one seventh of the country’s population) due 
to an increase in funding. This is impressive given that the institute first opened its doors 
over 40 years ago back in 1965. The institute teaches everything from English to 
computer training. Over 50 percent of its students have not graduated from high school 
and its clients vary from women trying to prepare themselves for a career to indigenous 
groups looking to start tourism projects and export goods. The Maleku indigenous 
people, for instance, from the province of Alajuela have benefited from course offerings 
in arts and crafts, English and business, in part because of their own requests. Due to their 
training, the Maleku are now selling their crafts throughout the country and offering tours 
of their reserve. This year the institute plans to create a Center for Productive and 
Competitive Micro, Small and Medium Businesses in conjuncture with the Ministries of 
Public Education, Economy, and Agriculture. The center’s objectives range from product 
design to marketing to access to credit (Stanley, 2006: 6). This recent accomplishment by 
the government in spending and inter-institutional cooperation is a strategic investment 
that will undoubtedly pay dividends for the poor and marginalized long into the future.  
However, even with a tax reform, the government will still need additional help 
from outside actors in order to more efficiently and effectively reduce poverty. Currently, 
the government has received such help in multiple ways. Fundes, a Costa Rican-based 
nonprofit organization dedicated to the promotion of small and medium businesses, has 
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reduced the time required to register most small businesses from 45 days to one day in 
the 14 Municipalities with which the organization works (Goodier, 2005: 15). 
Meanwhile, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has recently given the country 
a $116.8 million loan to help small businesses (Kimitch, 2005: 3). There is also the 
example of ACTUAR among many others. Nevertheless, the government remains the 
most important actor in poverty alleviation and for the development of the country in 
general. Indeed, if the state does not receive more money to provide for the wellbeing of 
its people and if it cannot more effectively regulate the economy and its industries, then 
the people of this country will face a rising tide of crime, environmental destruction, 
disintegrating family values and an increase in poverty that will ultimately put the future 





























As Costa Rica hangs on to its social-democratic roots while simultaneously 
opening up its economy through piecemeal neoliberal reform, the question of how to best 
develop a sustainable and healthy society becomes ever more pertinent. Neoliberal 
economic development in Costa Rica, like Latin America in general, has proven 
disappointing in its ability to reduce poverty because the wealth brought into the society 
has been distributed unevenly, leaving many people poor while forcing others into 
poverty through either exploitation or competition. Even worse, most of these people are 
left with little or no recourse to improve their lives. Within this context, Costa Rican 
society is divided on whether or not to ratify the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). An extension of neoliberal policies, this 
trade agreement, as a contract between the United States and Costa Rica, would affect 
Costa Rica in multiple ways: it would continue to lower tariffs, particularly on 
agricultural imports, it would open up Costa Rica’s state run monopoly on insurance and 
telecommunications to competition, it would strengthen U.S. property rights in Costa 
Rica, and it would continue to reduce the government’s control over the economy 
through foreign investment. At the same time, it would further open the U.S. market to 
Costa Rican imports.  
In reality then, Costa Rica faces more than a simple agreement on free trade; it 
faces a contract involving multiple dimensions of the neoliberal model.
80
 Some aspects of 
the agreement are simply deepening or reaffirming the right for the United States to 
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 The agreement also has similar conditions for each of the other signatory countries. In light of this, DR-
CAFTA is essentially several bilateral neoliberal package agreements between each of the involved 
countries and the U.S.  
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continue its current level of exploitation under neoliberal policies. Take, for example, 
article 10.9
81
 on performance requirements under the chapter concerning investment. This 
article stipulates that a corporation from the United States that resides anywhere in Costa 
Rica is allowed to bring or buy from the United States (or anywhere else) all the inputs it 
needs, without the obligation of creating backward links to Costa Rican suppliers. As a 
result, the only obligation of the corporation (besides limited taxes) is providing wages to 
employees. In this way, the United States reaffirms (and solidifies) that it is acceptable 
for its corporations to make huge profits through use of the country’s labor, with no 
obligation to share any substantial portion of that wealth with a disadvantaged country. 
Considering that between 1999 and 2003, 54.1 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Costa Rica came from the United States, this reaffirmation carries a lot of weight for 
Costa Rica (Antillón et al., 2005: 30).
82
  
One of the more immediate concerns of the agreement, however, is that of 
intellectual property rights. Securing property rights was, from the beginning, part of the 
Washington Consensus. However, even the Consensus may not have foreseen the way in 
which the United States contemplates using intellectual property rights to outlaw the sale 
of affordable generic drugs. According to DR-CAFTA, the U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies would have exclusive rights to distribute brand name drugs for five years 
during which time Costa Ricans would not be able to buy the cheaper generic versions of 
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 Another area where the United States can continue to exploit Costa Ricans without sufficient 
compensation is through trade liberalization. Chapter four under “Primary Sector” briefly contemplates the 




 (Antillón et al., 2005: 48). With the Costa Rican Social Security System 
(the universal healthcare provider) in financial hardship, and the cost of medicine rising, 
Costa Ricans will have to pay more to stay healthy (Fischer, 2006: 5) and the poor may 
be forced to suffer as a result. Stricter patent laws would affect farmers too. The seed 
industry, a $30 billion a year business with six companies holding 70 percent of the 
profits, would have copyright protection in Costa Rica for seed strain patents that exist on 
some of the most basic agricultural products such as rice, wheat and corn (Fischer, 2006: 
5). The patents would be good for ten years (Antillón et al., 2005: 48) and force many 
farmers to discontinue use of their own seed supplies while only allowing the most 
profitable to begin buying from multinationals. And even these farmers would be hard-
pressed or unable to compete with cheaper imported products due to tariff reductions 
(Fischer, 2006: 5).  
The agreement also threatens to essentially privatize part of the Costa Rican 
Electricity Institute (ICE) by opening it up to private competition. ICE provides two basic 
social services that are indispensable for the wellbeing of Costa Ricans: electricity and 
telecommunications. While neoliberal supporters see the competition as a way of forcing 
ICE to increase efficiency and lower costs, others feel that many poor people will suffer 
in the end. Take telephone service for example. Currently, ICE provides services to the 
poor at below cost and covers these costs by making higher profit margins in more 
lucrative settings where businesses and families can afford to pay more. However, the 
competition, it is feared, will provide cheaper services in the more lucrative settings, 
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 While Costa Ricans may have the opportunity to enforce copyright laws in these areas on the United 
States, its ability to do so is almost non-existent. To give you an idea of the asymmetry between the two 
countries, in 2002 the number of patents granted to Costa Rican nationals was two. In the United States, for 
that same year, the number of patents granted to U.S. citizens was 84,271 (Antillón et al., 2005: 45).    
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thereby undermining ICE’s ability to provide what is considered a universal service by 
the state. While DR-CAFTA explicitly recognizes the state’s social objectives of 
universality and solidarity, and mentions the need to create a regulatory agency that 
would have jurisdiction over the granting of licenses to new participants in the market 
and rate establishment, many doubt whether the government will be able to set up a 
sufficiently strong institution so that ICE can continue to provide its services to poor 
populations (Antillón et al., 2005: 51-53). Moreover, even if ICE is able to do this, it will 
likely be with significantly less profits from which to work from and with the potential 
need for government subsidies.
84
  
In the end, DR-CAFTA reaffirms and deepens neoliberal policies that have up to 
this point brought inequality to the country and ignored the wellbeing of many of the 
nation’s poor. Although the agreement on balance would likely increase poverty in the 
nation, the country can pass legislation that would help offset the agreement’s negative 
affects, and may allow the country to lower poverty rates despite ratification. With or 
without DR-CAFTA however, the state needs to make these changes. Most of the areas in 
which the country could use this legislation have already been touched upon. In 
particular, the country needs a tax reform that would help facilitate continued increased 
investment in education, more social spending, the strengthening of small and medium 
businesses, and stronger linkages between various enterprises within (and also between) 
different sectors of the economy. In addition, different state institutions need to become 
more efficient in their functions as providers and regulators to make better use of limited 
money. Furthermore, environmental legislation needs to be strengthened and more 
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strongly enforced, especially in light of the developing tourist industry. Once DR-
CAFTA is ratified, new laws that would violate provisions of the trade agreement cannot 
be passed. This would in effect prevent stricter environmental legislation (or labor 
legislation) from being approved (Gabriela Díaz, 2005: 5) because of the detrimental 
affect it would likely have on the earnings of U.S. companies. If there are disputes over 
the legitimacy of a law under DR-CAFTA between a TNC and the Costa Rican 
government, the problem must be resolved outside Costa Rican courts, thereby 
weakening the government’s ability to enforce its own laws and costing the state money 
to resolve the issue.   
Unfortunately, with a new president (Oscar Arias) and a new composition of 
congressional representatives in the legislative assembly that view DR-CAFTA in an 
overall favorable light, Costa Rica will likely ratify the agreement in a matter of months, 
despite stiff popular opposition. Even more regrettably, Arias has not yet mentioned an 
intention to open discussions regarding how the country can prepare for the adversities to 
development that DR-CAFTA would create. Nevertheless, to his credit, he has made a 
commitment to improvement in public education in addition to using foreign investment 
to fund critical areas of government policy, such as social spending to relieve extreme 
poverty (Fischer, 2006: 5).  
 
The Larger Picture 
 
The hardships facing Costa Rica manifest themselves in terrible and unique ways 
throughout Latin America. They are the result of the discrimination inherent in the 
neoliberal economic model and they are perceived through inequality and sustained 
poverty. This is primarily a systemic problem that takes on a life of its own through the 
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desires of individuals to earn a profit in a cutthroat world of competition, fueled by 
consumers’ desires to choose the lowest price possible on goods or services that by all 
other accounts are perceived to be equal. However, the lower economic cost generally 
reflects not only increased efficiency through economies of scale, but also the use of 
lower cost labor and often the exploitation of the environment, particularly on the part of 
transnational companies located in developing countries for the benefit of the 
consumption patterns in more developed countries. The United States, for example, 
would not be able to achieve its current average standard of living if it did not take 
advantage of the labor and resources of less developed countries.  
Consequently, we take more than we give to these countries. Over the last decade 
or so, Costa Rica has maintained low levels of poverty more in despite of cheaper 
imports, increased exports and foreign direct investment than because of them. As long as 
the primary interest of foreign investors is to make money, with a false notion that the 
side effect on the nation’s people is, on balance always positive, and as long as those that 
stand to win in the developing country see a market-run economy in the same light, then 
the poor and vulnerable will continue to be exploited. While minimum wage jobs may 
allow employment for poor people who would otherwise not have a job, the income 
generally is not enough to end that poverty. Meanwhile the reduction of the size of the 
state and the loss of agricultural jobs has displaced many people with previously decent 
incomes.  
Indeed, the market has done little to cure the ills of Costa Rica. Strong investment 
in health and education are key components to reducing poverty that FDI does little to 
support because such an investment is not lucrative in and of itself. It takes a state with 
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sufficient funds to maintain the health of the poor so that they can achieve an education 
and earn a better job. Electricity, sufficient housing and affordable water are also 
necessary to provide for the poor. Indeed, the poor will not attend school if they must 
work all day to achieve what they deem is a minimum level of comfort, which in this day 
and age often involves electricity, water and phone bills. The cost of school only makes 
this problem more severe. Poor people are also at a disadvantage because the lower level 
of education in their families makes it harder to find support for homework. Finally, a 
lack of interest in formal education due either to uninspiring educators or because of 
dissonance between the work involved in completing education and its relationship with 
the promise for a better future, create a situation where students drop out. In a survey 
completed in Costa Rica in 2001, 71.6 percent of Costa Rican students aged 12 to 17 
cited their absence from school was primarily either because of work (11.6 percent), 
because they were not interested in formal education (27.9 percent), because studying 
was too hard (11.9 percent) or because they could not pay for their studies (20.2 percent) 
(Castro, 2002: 21).  
However, in order to provide a strong investment in health, basic services and 
formal education for the poor, the state must find financing. While taxation on income is 
one method, state-owned services such as telecommunications and insurance provide 
another way for the government to redistribute wealth to the poor in a strategic manner. 
However, the government, with the help of non-profits and other good-willed 
organizations also has the responsibility of informing and empowering the poor of 
possible methods of sustainable community development. Costa Rica, as a welfare state, 
has always tried to provide for its poor, but has insufficiently tried to help them help 
 72
themselves in a coordinated manner. With sufficient education, access to credit and 
community coordination, the marginalized have the opportunity to become vibrant, 
thriving citizens and residents by taking strategic advantage of local assets in relation to 
domestic and international demands for various products or services. In this way, 
communities can design job-based poverty alleviation strategies that best fit the social 
and cultural needs of the community (under the guidance of labor and environmental 
laws of course). This would also have the additional advantage of helping alleviate the 
social disintegration plaguing Costa Rica as seen through increased crime and more 
female headed poor households—both of which, as we have seen, have ways of blocking 
poverty alleviation.  
Nevertheless, the exploitation of individuals and communities in Costa Rica and 
around the world will probably not disappear anytime soon. However, Costa Rica has 
some advantages that other developing countries do not have which the country can use 
for its benefit. In particular, the country has an abundance of natural attractions, some 
unique cultures and a stable image that attracts tourists. It also has a government that is 
still capable of providing significant resources for its disadvantaged. Even so, the country 
as it exists within the current neoliberal paradigm remains vulnerable to the international 
winds of change. While exports and imports can provide opportunities for development 
and growth that could not otherwise be achieved, they simultaneously create an economy 
that is vulnerable to changes in demands, supplies and costs of goods and services. In 
other words, periods of prosperity are vulnerable to bust. In a small, open economy like 
Costa Rica, the country can diversify its imports and exports only to a limited degree so 
as to reduce risk. Even so, certain commodities like petroleum have far-reaching effects 
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on all aspects of the economy. Given this, it would be wise for Costa Rica to maintain 
some economic self-sufficiency in areas of life essential to health such as production of 
food or energy sources, but preferably with as little degradation to the environment as 
possible. While the country may never be able to escape poverty in a sustainable manner 
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B. A List of Acronyms  
 
 
DR-CAFTA (U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement) 
 
ECLAC (Economic Commission and Latin America and the Caribbean) 
 
FDI (foreign direct investment) 
 
FTA (free trade agreement) 
 
FZ (Free Zone) 
 
GPD (gross domestic product) 
 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
 
ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) 
 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 
 
NGO (non-governmental organization) 
 
R & D (research and development) 
 
SME (small and medium enterprise) 
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